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“The most important point is, in a time of crisis, there is no way out 
but for the government to be bold and aggressive.” 
Mark Zandi1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
By now many homeowners have heard about the Mortgage 
Forgiveness Debt Relief Act that resulted from the 2007 financial crisis, 
which continues to loom over homeowners who own underwater 
properties.2 On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed a bill that 
extended the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act through December 
31, 2016, providing an extension of the law and retroactive coverage for 
mortgage debt cancelled in 2015 so that homeowners do not have to pay 
taxes on forgiven debt from the sale of their principal residences.3 
In March 2015, between 6 million and 9.7 million homes nationwide 
were underwater, meaning the loan balance was greater than the property 
value.4 With an underwater property, also known as an upside-down 
 
 1.  See generally MARK ZANDI, PAYING THE PRICE: ENDING THE GREAT RECESSION AND 
BEGINNING A NEW AMERICAN CENTURY (2013). Mark M. Zandi is chief economist of Moody’s 
Analytics, where he directs economic research. Moody’s Analytics, a subsidiary of Moody’s Corp., 
is a leading provider of economic research, data and analytical tools. Mark Zandi, MOODY’S 
ANALYTICS, https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/index (last visited Apr. 8, 2016). 
 2.  “Underwater” is a term of art coined after the 2007 financial crisis, which led to a 
catastrophic decline in residential property values for millions of homeowners whose significantly 
devalued property values were worth far less than the remaining mortgage balances. See generally 
PETER DEIER ET AL., UNDERWATER AMERICA 5 (Haas Inst. ed., 2014), 
http://diversity.berkeley.edu/underwater-america-report (last visited Dec. 11, 2014). See also FIN. 
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 495 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [hereinafter FCIC REPORT]; 
Christopher Matthews, After 8 Years, The Real Estate Market is Finally Looking Normal Again, 
FORTUNE (Mar. 31, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2014/03/31/after-8-years-the-
real-estate-market-is-finally-looking-normal-again/. 
 3.  Peter Thomas Ricci, Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Act Extended to 2017, BOSTON AGENT 
MAGAZINE (Dec. 21, 2015), https://bostonagentmagazine.com/2015/12/21/mortgage-forgiveness-
debt-act-extended-to-2017/. 
 4.  Florida, for example, has had in excess of 1 million of those properties. Drew Harwell, 
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property, homeowners who sold their property for less than they owed 
faced tax consequences. What owning underwater property means for 
homeowners is that the home’s current market value is less than the 
mortgage balance, making it impossible to sell or refinance the home 
without the lender’s cooperation. Many homeowners, who may be in 
financial distress and can no longer afford their homes because of national 
or personal financial crises,5 cannot sell their underwater property6 
without their lender’s agreement to accept less than the mortgage loan 
balance upon the sale of the property. Lender approval of this type of 
transaction is necessary for many current homeowners trying to sell their 
homes in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis, which has left many 
 
Expiration of Mortgage-Forgiveness Tax Break Triggers Fears for Distressed Homeowners, TAMPA 
BAY NEWS, http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/realestate/mortgage-forgiveness-tax-break-
expires-triggering-new-worries-for/2160925 (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). See also Tory Barringer, 9.7 
Million Homeowners Underwater, DS NEWS, http://dsnews.com/news/05-20-2014/9-7-million-
homeowners-underwater (last visited Jul. 25, 2014); 9.1 Million U.S. Residential Properties Seriously 
Underwater in First Quarter, Lowest Level in Two Years, REALTYTRAC (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/q1-2014-home-equity-and-
underwater-report-8037 (reporting 17% of U.S. properties are seriously underwater, down from 26% 
a year ago); Erin Carlyle, Study Finds 6.4 Million U.S. Homeowners Still Have 
Underwater Mortgages, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/erincarlyle/2013/12/17/6-4-million-still-have-underwater-mortgages-as-of-q3-2013-says-
corelogic/ (noting that underwater properties are “often called ‘upside down’ or ‘negative equity’ 
properties, meaning that borrowers owe more on their mortgages than the homes are worth”); 8.1 
Million U.S. Residential Properties Seriously Underwater in Third Quarter, Lowest Level in Two 
Years, REALTYTRAC (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-
report/q3-2014-us-home-equity-and-underwater-report-8166 (stating that 8.1 million U.S. residential 
properties were seriously underwater, “representing 15 percent of all properties with a mortgage and 
an estimated $1.4 trillion in negative equity”). It appears from its website that CoreLogic began 
regularly publishing its Negative Equity Report for residential real estate around 2010, upon which 
the real estate and financial industries and media sources rely. See generally CORELOGIC, 
www.corelogic.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
 5.  The distress of financial crisis left many Americans unemployed, underemployed, or forced 
to relocate to other communities/cities for work or better opportunities. The exodus in many 
communities forced homeowners to abandon homes they could no longer afford, causing historic 
foreclosure rates in both middle class and lower-income communities. Stanley Fischer, Vice 
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Speech, At the “The Great 
Recession—Moving Ahead,” a Conference Sponsored by the Swedish Ministry of Finance, 
Stockholm, Sweden (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/fischer20140811a.htm. For example, “job cuts at federal, state, and local governments have 
reduced payrolls by almost 3/4 of a million workers, resulting in a decline in total government civilian 
employment of 3-1/4 percent since its peak in early 2009.” Id. Further strengthening of the economy 
will likely pull some of workers back into the labor market, although skills and networks may have 
depreciated some over the past years. Id. See also FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 203. 
 6.  Current Market Value, as the author uses the concept, means what a willing third party 
buyer would pay for the property at the time of contracting with the homeowner, based on either 
current appraisal values or values of similar properties recently sold in the same area. See generally 
Guide Note 11: Comparable Selection in a Declining Market, APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, 
http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/assets/1/7/guide-note-11.pdf. 
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American homeowners unemployed, underemployed, or forced to 
relocate to other communities for better opportunities.7 
Homeowners who are willing to sell their homes to relieve their 
financial distress need their lender’s approval to accept a lesser amount 
than the existing mortgage balance in order to facilitate the real estate 
sales transaction at the deflated current market value. The mortgage 
lending and real estate sales industries refer to this type of real estate sales 
transaction as a “short sale,” or for purposes of this Article, a “mortgage 
short sale transaction,”8 or MSST, so as not to confuse the concept of a 
short sale as it is used in the securities market context.9 To use the MSST, 
homeowners and lenders must come to an agreement about the reduced 
payoff amount of the mortgage in order for the homeowner to complete 
the real estate transaction with the purchaser.10 The impact on lenders is 
that they more quickly receive a substantial amount of the mortgage 
balance versus allowing the property to go through the more costly 
foreclosure process. Lenders further incur a tax write-off for business loss 
on the forgiven loan balance.11 More importantly, lenders do not take 
 
 7.  The exodus in many communities forced homeowners to abandon homes they could no 
longer afford, causing historic foreclosure rates in both middle class and lower-income communities. 
Joshua Gardner, Skeletons of the Great Recession: These American Cities Are Still Plagued by Homes 
Abandoned to Foreclosure, DAILYMAIL (Jul. 14, 2014, 5:23 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2691092/Skeletons-Great-Recession-These-American-
cities-plagued-homes-abandoned-foreclosure.html. See generally The Housing Crisis and the 
Working Poor, CASAS DEL PUEBLO COMMUNITY LAND TRUST (Oct. 2013), http://cltnetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/2013-The-Housing-Crisis-and-Working-Poor.pdf. 
 8.  See MADISON, ET AL., 2 LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 12:10, Westlaw (database 
updated Dec. 2015) (detailing residential real estate short sale procedure context); see also 33A AM. 
JUR.2d Federal Taxation ¶ 10232, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2016) (listing examples of how 
short sales are used including a short sale in the securities context where a contract for the sale of 
shares which the seller does not own or the certificates for which are not within his control so as to 
be available for delivery at the time when the delivery must be made). A full discussion of a securities 
short sale is beyond the scope of this Article and does not have the same meaning and application as 
an MSST discussed herein. See also KRISTY A. HERNANDEZ, EDUCATING UNDERWATER 
HOMEOWNERS ON THE OPTIONS FOR KEEPING OR LEAVING THEIR HOMES (Aspatore, Oct. 2012), 
2012 WL 4364153. 
 9.  Michael A. Valenza, Digest of Selected Articles, 38 REAL EST. L.J. 122, 122 (2009). Only 
a few years ago residential real estate mortgage “short sales were an unheard of occurrence in most 
markets.” Id. See also Phil M. Fowler, Legal Definition of a Short Sale, SFGATE: HOME GUIDES, 
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/legal-definition-short-sale-7218.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2014); 
CORELOGIC, supra note 4.  
 10.  “A Short Sale is where the lender or investor agrees to accept an amount less than is 
actually owed on the property.” Alexander von Bryce, Short Sale vs. Short Payoff—Advantages and 
Disadvantages of Each, NEW HAMPSHIRE SHORT SALE CENTER (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://nhshortsalecenter.com/2011/02/14/short-sale-vs-short-payoff-advantages-and-disadvantages-
of-each/. 
 11.  “Creditors often write off debts after a set period of time—for example, one, two, or three 
years after you default. The creditor stops its collection efforts, declares the debt uncollectible, and 
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ownership of, or liability for, the property. For homeowners, the results 
are not so positive. They are able to sell their underwater property, but, 
consequentially, they lose all their paid-in or market-incurred equity and 
incur tax liability from the lender’s forgiveness of indebtedness of the 
mortgage balance. Thus, given these outcomes, the tax implication of 
MSSTs is inequitably balanced in lenders’ favor, while, for homeowners, 
the transaction creates new financial distress because of the tax liability 
consequences. 
In the current market, with almost ten million homes still underwater, 
MSSTs are often the only way for homeowners to sell their property.12 
For homeowners who do not fully understand, or are completely 
unknowledgeable about, the tax consequences of MSSTs, MSSTs seem 
like a win-win situation for themselves and lenders, especially with the 
government, lenders, and real estate sales professionals marketing MSSTs 
to homeowners. This win-win perception, however, is a fallacy. For 
homeowners, the perception is that they are now able to sell the property 
to relieve the financial stress of making mortgage payments, more freely 
relocate for work, and avoid the stress of foreclosure of their property. 
Emancipation from the mortgage allows them to pursue other life choices. 
This perception, however, does not follow the reality of MSSTs. 
Homeowners may find themselves in a worse financial situation with an 
MSST because of a tax liability, with accruing interest and penalties, that 
can plague homeowners up to seven years after entering into the MSST. 
Lenders, on the other hand, realize substantial benefits from MSSTs while 
ignoring the financial detriment to homeowners because any deference 
they give to homeowners’ interests would be in direct conflict with their 
own profitable interests. Traditionally, profit motivation forces lenders 
not to make concessions or take actions that would affect their 
profitability. Foreclosure proceedings and assuming title to the property, 
it turns out, affect their bottom line more than MSSTs. Lenders’ reality, 
not perception, is that they avoid greater losses through MSSTs of 
underwater property than lenders would through a judicial or non-judicial 
foreclosure or their own subsequent sale of the property to a third-party 
buyer.13 Thus, the win-win scenario of an MSST is a fallacy. 
 
reports it to the IRS as lost income to reduce its tax burden.” Tax Consequences When a Creditor 
Writes Off or Settles a Debt, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/tax-consequences-
settled-forgiven-debt-29792.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). 
 12.  See Carlyle, supra note 4. Underwater homes are commonly known as “‘upside down’ or 
‘negative equity’ properties, meaning that borrowers owe more on their mortgages than the homes 
are worth.” Id. 
 13.  “It is also likely, given the current housing environment, that John’s lender nets a greater 
return through a short sale of the property than the lender would have received, if it had taken back 
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Moreover, under the current industry practice, and to avoid the 
unauthorized practice of law, Realtors who engage in MSSTs, and 
logically lenders too, are under no legal obligation to disclose the financial 
disadvantages homeowners may face with an MSST or to suggest other 
less financially burdensome options of disposing of the property, such as 
foreclosure.14 As far as lenders and real estate sales professionals are 
concerned, they walk away from MSSTs with a mortgage loan balance 
removed from liabilities on their balance sheet, no obligation to manage 
or sell a post-foreclosure property, or a commission check for their 
services. 
The quagmire15 of financial indebtedness created by current tax laws 
and policy related to MSSTs for homeowners, however, imposes an 
onerous burden on taxpayers selling underwater properties. The 
government and lenders, through various programs implemented to help 
distressed homeowners with underwater properties, have instilled a belief 
among homeowners that MSSTs are a positive vehicle for selling their 
underwater properties. This holds true especially because the government 
prioritized homeownership-related tax policy to promote homeownership 
beginning with Roosevelt’s New Deal in 1933. But prior to 2007, MSSTs 
were virtually non-existent. There is very little literature about, or 
statistics on, MSSTs, likely because of the private nature of the transaction 
between homeowners and lenders. By forgiving the mortgage loan 
 
the property through nonjudicial foreclosure and subsequently sold it to a third party.” SENATE 
BANKING AND FINANCE INSTITUTIONS COMMITTEE, BILL ANALYSIS OF S.B. 412, as amended 
MARCH 21, 2011, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0401-
0450/sb_412_cfa_20110405_150830_sen_comm.html [hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS, SB 412]. 
 14.  See generally The Short Sale Flow: What the Listing Agent Should Know to Successfully Negotiate a Short 
Sale, Risk Management, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, http://www.realtor.org/law-and-
ethics/risk-management/the-short-sale-workflow (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). The National Association of 
Realtors advises its Realtors not to provide legal or financial advice. It provides in almost all its disclosures the following 
language, or something similar:  
IT IS NOT INTENDED TO AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL, FINANCIAL OR 
TAX ADVICE, AND SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS POLICY OF THE 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION. TO THE EXTENT LEGAL, FINANCIAL OR TAX 
ADVICE IS NEEDED BY A MEMBER OR A MEMBER’S CLIENT OR CUSTOMER, 
THOSE INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO CONSULT WITH THEIR 
LAWYER OR ACCOUNTANT.  
Id.  
 15.  Quagmire, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/quagmire?show=0&t=1418310421 (last visited Dec. 11, 2014) (defining quagmire as “a 
difficulty, precarious or entrapping position”); Quagmire, DICTONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/quagmire?s=t (last visited Dec. 11, 2014) (defining quagmire 
as “a situation from which extrication is very difficult,” such as a quagmire of financial indebtedness). 
For this Article, the federal tax liability one owes to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service is a quagmire 
of financial indebtedness.  
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balance, however, lenders expose homeowners to two situations. First, 
homeowners face exposure to possible deficiency judgments for the 
amounts of the forgiven loan balances, which some state laws address.16 
Second, homeowners incur potential, unavoidable tax liability17 created 
by federal and state tax laws for the forgiven indebtedness, which is 
considered taxable income. It is the quagmire of the latter of these two 
situations facing middle-class homeowners with properties underwater 
that this Article addresses. 
The discussion among scholars on the issues affecting homeowners 
engaging in MSSTs in the residential real estate market is very limited. 
This Article not only provides a critique of the government’s tax and 
public policies, but also presents an analysis that exposes the 
contradictions of the transactional relationship between homeowners and 
lenders in MSSTs. Furthermore, the Article focuses on the laws regarding 
MSSTs that seem to provide a consumer protection focus, but, in reality, 
 
 16.  Currently, several states have passed deficiency judgments legislation, or non-recourse 
statutes, which bar lenders from collecting a deficiency balance, specifically after a foreclosure but 
which may also cover MSSTs. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.45 (LEXIS, through the 2015 First Regular 
Session and the First, Second, and Third Special Sessions of the Twenty-Ninth State Legislature); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-729.A, 814.G (LEXIS, through 2016 emergency legislation effective 
as of April 5, 2016); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580e (LEXIS, through Chapter 11 of the 2016 Regular 
Session and Chapter 3 of the 2015-16 2nd Extraordinary Session); FLA. STAT. § 702.06(2) (LEXIS, 
through Chapter 243 with the exception of Chapters 16, 40, 140, 160, 178, 220, 224, and 231), as 
amended by Fla. H.B. 35; IOWA CODE § 654.6 (LEXIS, through all legislation signed as of May 12, 
2016 from the 2016 Second Regular Session of the 86th General Assembly); MINN. STAT. § 582.30 
(LEXIS, through Act chapter 84 of the 2016 Regular Session); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-232 
(LEXIS, current through 2015 Legislative Session); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-21.36, 45-21.38 (LEXIS, 
through Session Laws 2016-3, 2016 2nd Extra Session, but not including corrections and changes 
made by the Revisor of Statutes); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-03 (LEXIS, through all acts signed by 
the governor through the end of 2015 Regular Legislative Session including changes and corrections 
made by the North Dakota Code Revisor); OR. REV. STAT. § 88.103 (LEXIS, through all Acts of the 
2016 Legislative Session (1-124) with the exception of ORS Chapters 163A, 181A, 350, 431A, 475B, 
and 743B); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 846.04 (LEXIS, current through 2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 61.12 
(LEXIS, current through 2015 3rd Special Session and 2015 election (2016 c 1 and 2)). California 
has the broadest protection for borrowers among the statutes. See also Kathleen K. Wright, Short 
Sales as Nonrecourse Mortgages, TAX ANALYST 31 (Jan. 6, 2014), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/71st0027.pdf. One-action statutes allow lenders a choice between an 
action of foreclosure or suing to collect the debt, but not both. List of Non-Recourse Mortgage States 
and Statutes, HELOCBASICS: A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO HELOC LOANS, 
http://www.helocbasics.com/list-of-non-recourse-mortgage-states-and-anti-deficiency-statutes/ (last 
visited Dec. 13, 2014). The following states have some type of one-action statute: California, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, New York, and Utah. Id. 
 17.  Tax burden here not only means the financial liability but the unchallengeable collection 
methods the IRS invokes for collection of the financial liability. See Tanina Rostain & Milton C. 
Regan Jr., The IRS Under Siege, GEORGETOWN LAW (2014), 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/georgetown-law-magazine/upload/54-61_faculty-
article_WEB.pdf. 
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provide incentives that do not benefit consumers, or in this case, 
homeowners. In this respect, one must acknowledge that MSSTs have 
created a hardship on consumers. In this vein, the government and lending 
industry roles in perpetuating MSSTs are an example of the failure of 
pragmatic lawmaking to address the needs of citizens in a time of crisis, 
particularly the 2007 financial crisis. 
Thus, the scope of this Article is two-fold. First, this Article 
contextualizes the evolution of MSSTs as a lender’s tool used to avoid 
owning underwater real property through the foreclosure process and to 
avoid the resulting liability exposures associated with properties owned 
by lenders, known as REOs, or Real Estate Owned by Lenders. In 
particular, it identifies how government and lender promotion of MSSTs 
as a solution to homeowners’ financial burdens of owning or being unable 
to sell underwater property is only a cognitive perception. In reality, the 
true benefits are realized by lenders through minimized losses and by the 
government through potential tax revenues, which is contrary to decades 
of economic and public policy based on the need for public housing. 
Second, this Article criticizes the government for the lack of pragmatic 
current federal tax laws and policies to provide comprehensive relief for 
homeowners with underwater properties.18 The Article does not stop with 
criticism of present policy. Instead, this Article provides a proposal for 
amending existing legislation that would permit use of MSSTs to provide 
the type of relief for homeowners that remains vital. The pragmatic tax 
relief proposed in this Article is needed to remedy the inadequacies of 
existing federal tax laws and the failure of newly created tax laws to take 
into account the evolutionary realities of the real estate markets since the 
2007 financial crisis for homeowners with underwater properties, which 
still plague the current real estate market. The government should amend 
the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 to incorporate: the 
same exclusionary treatment for secondary homes as principal homes; the 
inclusion of a principal residence that changes status due to economic 
hardship but qualified as a principal residence any time after 2007; an 
exclusion from taxable income similar to the I.R.C. § 121, for either a 
principal residence to a secondary residence; and an extension of these 
 
 18.  Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 provisions apply to debt forgiven in 
calendar years 2007 through 2016. Pub. L. 110-142, H.R. 3648, was originally enacted in 2007 (for 
three years), renewed for three additional years through December 31, 2013, renewed in December 
2014 to cover tax year 2014, renewed in December 2015 to cover tax year 2015 . See I.R.C. § 
108(a)(1)(E) (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). See generally INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, DEP’T OF THE TREAS., PUBLICATION 4681, CANCELLED DEBTS, FORECLOSURES, 
REPOSSESSIONS, AND ABANDONMENTS (FOR INDIVIDUALS) (2015) [hereinafter IRS PUBLICATION 
4681]. 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss4/2
2 - PORTER MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  12:32 PM 
2016] THE QUAGMIRE OF MORTGAGE SHORT SALE TRANSACTIONS 821 
provisions until the underwater property market is eliminated, or at a 
superficial volume. The lack of scholarship addressing these specific 
issues,19 especially as it pertains to the potential tax liability for 
homeowners with underwater properties, makes this Article particularly 
pertinent to the scholarly discussion. 
Part II contends that governmental public policy, particularly, social 
policy which reflects the social values or norms of its citizens, should be 
implemented to address the disparities that arise given the lender-
consumer relational dynamics that typically result in more harm than 
benefit for consumers, specifically related to MSSTs discussed in this 
Article. 
Part III provides a much-needed historical context for the 
introduction of MSSTs into the residential real estate finance market after 
the 2007 financial crisis. This section identifies the illusory advantages 
and tangible disadvantages to homeowners, primarily tax-related, when 
engaging in MSSTs. It contrasts these disadvantages with the low risk to 
lenders for approving MSSTs. (Part III also notes that the current tax 
policy underlying MSSTs is contrary to America’s long standing public 
policy that emphasizes home ownership.) 
Part IV of this Article analyzes existing tax treatment of MSST 
transactions and provides a critique of the solvency rules affecting middle-
class taxpayers. It suggests that Congress’s tax treatment of MSSTs, to 
date through the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act, of 2007 has been 
insufficient in several ways and that Congress should apply a broader 
scope to existing, and any newly created, tax laws in order to provide 
meaningful tax relief to middle-class taxpayers with underwater principal 
and underwater secondary residences. 
Part V proposes alternatives to MSSTs that homeowners can 
consider to avoid the onerous tax liabilities and suggests antidotes for 
policymakers to implement meaningful federal tax policy reform still 
needed to rescue middle-class homeowners from the potential tax burdens 
associated with MSSTs. Part V suggests that Congress should follow the 
pattern created in the special agreement in place for California, which is 
the only state to date that has secured a special agreement with the IRS to 
 
 19.  Some debate has arisen that generally discusses the need to extend a tax exception that 
allows taxpayers to avoid liability for cancellation of indebtedness. See Dustin A. Zacks, Avoid Insult 
to Injury: Extending and Expanding Cancellation of Indebtedness Income Tax Exemption for 
Homeowners, 66 ARK. L. REV. 317 (2013); see also Bradford P. Anderson, Robbing Peter To Pay 
for Paul’s Residential Real Estate Speculation: The Injustice of Not Taxing Forgiven Mortgage Debt, 
36 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 10 (2011). These articles fail to discuss the various circumstances in 
which such exceptions would apply and the actual burdens placed on taxpayers if Congress does not 
take action, or to give any context for which the financial crisis contributed to this problem.  
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allow a residence to avoid tax liability from MSSTs regardless of 
solvency, relating to a principal residence. The Article also suggests that 
Congress should extend the scope of the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt 
Relief Act of 2007 (MFRDA); provide similar, favorable treatment for 
principal and secondary residences; exclude residences from taxable 
income; and take other government “paternalistic” actions to assist 
homeowners with underwater property. The financial crisis that led to the 
tremendous amount of underwater property was a catastrophic 
earthquake, the after-shocks of which will continue for many years to 
come, and the government must come to its citizens’ aid in this time of 
crisis. 
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY REASON FOR TAX RELIEF FOR MSSTS 
The strength of American democracy lies in its social values.20 
Public policy reflects social values, and policy influences public choice.21 
The government’s public policy is often revealed through the legislation 
it enacts to address social concerns and to protect the well-being of its 
citizens, e.g., when it passes new laws, or provides public services, to 
redress the current problems affecting its citizens.22 The government’s 
goal in implementing changes in the law, or offering services, is often to 
correct societal maladies that affect the economic welfare of the nation, 
and, ultimately, to improve the quality of life for its citizens.23 
The federal government has long been committed to providing “a 
decent home and suitable living environment” for all its citizens.24 
Traditionally, the federal government has supported and initiated policy 
to promote homeownership through legislation aimed at benefiting its 
citizens, starting with the various New Deal laws enacted in the 1930s 
during the Roosevelt Administration25 and continuing through the 1990s 
 
 20.  See DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY ix (Milton M. Carrow, et al., eds. 
1998).  
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  William E. Forbath, Social and Economic Rights in American Grain: Reclaiming 
Constitutional Political Economy, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, 59 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. 
Siegel eds., Oxford University Press 2009). 
 24.  Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (1949), codified as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1441 (1949). 
 25.  Tracie R. Porter, Pawns for the Higher Greed: The Banking and Financial Services 
Industry’s Capture of Federal Homeownership Policy and the Impact on Citizen Homeowners, 37 
HAMLINE L. REV. 139, 155-56 (2013) (discussing the homeownership policy integral to Roosevelt’s 
plan for recovery of the national economy and for individual homeowners, through passage of several 
instrumental federal laws). The New Deal laws dealt with sweeping reforms to deal with a broad 
range of maladies that plagued citizens after the 1920’s financial collapse, particularly in the real 
10
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during the George W. Bush administration.26 Thus, the government’s 
influence on and endorsement of its citizens becoming homeowners is 
well entrenched in the government’s public policy platform.27 The 
government’s actions in redressing the current crisis in home ownership 
caused by the large quantity of underwater property should not be myopic 
because the legislation not only benefits its citizens, but it also strengthens 
the national economy. Therefore, in the current depressed real estate 
market, with millions of citizens who own homes that are underwater, 
Congress should enact new legislation or modify existing legislation to 
address the severe tax liability implications for homeowners. This 
legislation would promote home ownership, which has been a 
foundational principle of the American economy. This aid is especially 
necessary for homeowners who find that MSSTs are the best means by 
which to sell their homes.28 The federal government, therefore, should 
promulgate a new and practical homeownership tax policy that does not 
create onerous tax liabilities for taxpayers, given that prior policies 
incentivized taxpayers to become homeowners. The tax savings benefits 
from homeownership relate to deductions that allow wealth-building 
because of the money homeowners save, as opposed to paying taxes when 
they lack the benefit of deductions or exclusions.29 
The government has long prioritized homeownership-related tax 
policy. Subsequent to strong federal legislative reform in the 1930s, the 
government further substantiated the social good of homeownership by 
 
estate area with passage of the federal legislation and creation of federal agencies to implement the 
new laws to get the economy and citizens back in better financial positions. Id. 
 26.  Id.  
 27.  The severity of the Great Recession and its ongoing fallout, importantly including its 
influence on public opinion, has heightened the focus on the challenge of avoiding another such crisis. 
See Fischer, supra note 5. 
 28.  For example, communities rebuild with homeowners who can afford the property, creating 
a stronger real estate tax base for local governments that the federal government has been aiding 
through funds delivered to depressed state governments. School districts, local safety services, and 
other local services have funding to support their communities. The social benefits of being in a stable 
community affect the morale of those who live in it. See Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen 
Virtues of Ownership, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 890, 891 n.4 (2011). The individual perceived benefits 
derived from homeownership pour over into the local economy, which could better thrive without 
federal government assistance. Id. In addition, homeownership provides a sense of social status and 
financial stability, from living in better neighborhoods with other homeowners and from steady 
inclines in property values that create equity wealth. Id. 
 29.  Understanding America’s Homeownership Gaps: 2003 Fannie Mae National Housing 
Survey, FANNIE MAE 5 (2004), http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/
research/housingsurvey/pdf/survey2003.pdf (finding that 46% of the respondents to a survey 
perceived a tax benefit of homeownership, and 84% perceived that buying a home was a good 
investment). See Calvin Johnson, The Taxation of the Really Big House, 122 TAX NOTES 915 (2009), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1520767. 
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implementing social policy through tax law reform that allowed tax 
deductions or exclusions under the tax code to taxpayers who owned 
homes. First, the qualified residence interest deduction (QRID) lowered 
the adjusted gross income upon which tax liability is determined.30 The 
QRID allows a yearly deduction for all mortgage interest taxpayers pay to 
lenders over the entirety of the mortgage term.31 As the second largest tax 
deduction under the tax code, second only to the employer-provided 
health insurance premium deduction, the QRID substantially reduces 
citizens’ tax obligations.32 Second, mortgage insurance premiums (MIP) 
homeowners pay to lenders are allowable deductions so long as lenders 
charge MIP on the mortgage loan.33 Third, real property taxes are also 
deductible each year of the mortgage.34 Fourth, there is a deduction for 
first-time buyers for certain costs incurred at the time of purchase, but 
people may qualify as a first-time buyer several times over their lives and 
take the deductions.35 Fifth, even more beneficial than the QRID and the 
three other deductions mentioned is the exclusion from taxable income for 
homeowners who sell their principal residences under § 121. 
Under § 121, the gain from the sale of a principal residence is 
excluded from taxable income, so taxpayers pay no taxes at all and pocket 
the income, up to $250,000 or $500,000.36 This exclusion is allowable 
 
 30.  I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). See Roberta F. 
Mann, Housing and the Mortgage Interest Deduction (2012), www.ssrn.com/abstract=2189873. 
 31.  Mann, supra note 30. Homeowners pay more in interest during the first half of the 
mortgage term than the latter, creating significant deductions. For example, a monthly payment on 
$100,000 mortgage with an interest rate of 5% over a 30-year term yields a monthly mortgage 
payment of $536.82, excluding any escrows for taxes and insurances. Of that monthly payment, about 
$416.67 is interest and $120.15 is applied to reduce the principal balance. 
 32.  I.R.C. § 163(h)(3).  
 33.  I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(E). This section covers Mortgage Insurance Premiums. Lenders 
typically charge MIP if the loan to property value ratio is less than 80%.  
 34.  I.R.C. § 164 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). In 2008 and 2009, even 
homeowners who did not itemize deductions could deduct real property taxes, by means of a special 
add-on to the standard deduction. I.R.C. § 63(c)(1) (LEXIS, through PL 114-152, approved 5/9/16) 
added Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3012. 
 35.  I.R.C. § 36 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). The credit evolved over 
time. First, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 established a $7,500 credit that must be 
repaid in equal installments over 15 years. Second, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 established an $8,000 credit with no requirement of repayment unless the house was no longer 
the taxpayer’s principal residence within the next three years. Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, I.R.C. §§ 
1-5. The Worker, Homeownership and Business Assistance Act of 2009 continued the $8,000 credit 
through 2010. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 2984, I.R.C. § 3304 (2012). The buyer need not be a true 
“first-time” homeowner, but, rather, the buyer must not have owned a home within the three-year 
period before the purchase. I.R.C. § 36(c). This provision was added by Pub.L. No. 110-289, Div. C, 
Title I, Subtitle B, § 3011(a), 122 Stat. 2888, and amended by Pub.L. No. 111-5, Div. B, Title I, 
Subtitle A, Part I, §§ 1006(a)–(c), (d)(2), (e), 123 Stat. 316, 317. 
 36.  I.R.C. § 121 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). Since 1997, this law allows 
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every five years.37 In essence, the government, through the tax code, 
allows a boondoggle, defined as “a project funded by the federal 
government out of political favoritism that is of no real value to the 
community or nation.”38 It is individual taxpayers who benefit from § 121, 
not the government or society. Thus, along with the public policy interest 
in helping homeowners recover from the financial crisis caused by 
government deregulation of the banking industry, § 121 allows the 
government the most reasonable justification for why homeowners with 
underwater properties should not be taxed at all for forgiven indebtedness 
resulting from MSSTs—it is shadow income at best, from which 
taxpayers see no tangible gain like under § 121. 
By enacting Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act and promoting 
programs39 to aid distressed homeowners, the government created a 
societal perception40 that new programs and homeownership tax laws 
would protect the welfare of its citizens in a time of crisis.41 The aftermath 
of the 2007 financial crisis will continue for many years to come, 
devastating the long-recognized social benefits of homeownership. 
MSSTs, as thus far permitted, jeopardize any wealth-building many 
taxpayers could realize or derive from homeownership-related tax 
deductions because the new tax liability MSSTs create jeopardizes their 
financial stability and impedes recovery. The government, therefore, must 
expand MFDRA coverage as a matter of public policy to provide a 
mechanism to protect the financial well-being of its citizens from the 
societal malady caused by the 2007 financial crisis, and, arguably, caused 
in part by the government’s action of misleading its citizens into 
homeownership.42 
 
one who sells a principal residence to exclude up to $500,000 (if married) and $250,000 (for 
individuals) of gain from their taxable income. 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Boondongle, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/boondoggle (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2016). 
 39.  See Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative Program: Overview, MAKING HOME 
AFFORDABLE, https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/foreclosure_alternatives.jsp (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2016) [hereinafter HAFA]. 
 40.  In the early 2000s, the perception the federal government and lenders created was that 
homeownership provides useful societal benefits, such as creating a “secure America.” Mann, supra 
note 30, at 3, n. 1 (citing George W. Bush, President Calls for Expanding Opportunities for Home 
Ownership, Remarks by the President on Home Ownership, St. Paul A.M.E. Church, Atlanta, Georgia 
(June 17, 2002, 11:10 AM), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020617-2.html). 
 41.  Mann, supra note 30. See also Stern, supra note 28, at 891. With homeownership, one 
could build wealth, improve educational outcomes for children, and participate in local government 
through voting and paying taxes. Id.  
 42.  See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 495. 
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Some researchers argue that a change in the tax code is particularly 
salient because they discredit prevailing notions of societal and personal 
benefit of homeownership.43 Some state that homeownership hinders 
employment mobility44 or creates financial hardship on those who cannot 
afford associated maintenance costs.45 If the government, therefore, was 
complicit in promoting homeownership, which has now caused detriment 
to its citizens, then the government should arguably do all it can to remedy 
the ill it has helped create. 
The practicality is that the impact of the 2007 financial crisis 
continues to impede homeowners severely.46 While Congress may be 
unable to fix all the consequences resulting from homeownership and this 
financial crisis, such as the underwater property market or the impact on 
local and state government, it can take action through homeownership tax 
law reform to remedy the adverse consequences the tax code places on 
homeowners in today’s real estate market. 
It is fundamentally unfair, given the current condition of the real 
estate market,47 for the government to burden its citizens with tax liability 
through MSSTs.48 The government’s obligation is to provide an equitable 
means to allow homeowners who have not been able to recover from the 
 
 43.  See generally Andrew J. Oswald, The Housing Market and Unemployment: A Non-
Technical Paper (1999), http://www.andrewoswald.com/docs/homesnt.pdf. 
 44.  Id. See Daniel N. Shaviro, The 2008 Financial Crisis: Implications for Income Tax Reform 
22, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442089 (last visited Dec. 8, 2014) (noting it is more costly to move as 
a homeowner than a renter, possibly slowing economic adjustment when jobs disappear in one area 
and arise in another area); see also Richard Florida, How the Crash will Reshape America, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/03/how-the-crash-will-
reshape-america/7293/6 (Noting homeownership makes the individual, and ultimately the society, 
less nimble, especially when labor markets are shifting within regions, and also creates a stagnant 
economy). Employment mobility is hindered because the need to sell an underwater home, or any 
home, makes it difficult to take jobs in other locations, fostering a mismatch between workers’ skills 
and available jobs when the local employment market tightens. Oswald, supra note 43.  
 45.  In addition to the monthly mortgage payment that could increase, homeowners facing 
financial hardship also must pay the rising costs of municipal taxes, such as real estate taxes, and 
maintenance of the property. See generally Fischer, supra note 5 (stating the main goals in the United 
States are those of the dual mandate: maximum employment and stable prices). For those homeowners 
who had just enough financial ability to pay the increased mortgage payment, they were left with little 
funds or no funds for other home-related costs, such as upkeep of the property or increases in local 
real estate taxes. See Oswald, supra note 43. 
 46.  Robert R. Callis & Melissa Kresin, Residential Vacancies and Homeownership in the Third 
Quarter 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.census.gov/
housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf. 
 47.  Financial crisis, and ultimately the real estate market collapse, was birthed from the 
government’s lack of regulation of mortgage lending practices. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2. 
 48.  Mortgage lenders failed to restrain themselves from introducing toxic mortgage products 
into the market, for which they were profit motivated, that ultimately stripped equity wealth from a 
vast number of citizens. See id. 
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continuing financial crisis to eliminate tax liability resulting from MSSTs 
by modifying the tax code. The government “owes to everyone an avenue 
to possess himself a portion of the [nation’s wealth] sufficient for his 
needs, through his own work . . . ,” and taxation of MSSTs denies that 
avenue to too many current homeowners.49 The equity wealth that 
millions of citizens lost, and continue to lose, resulted from the conduct, 
or lack thereof, of both the government regulators and self-regulating 
mortgage lenders.50 Homeowners should not suffer even more financial 
loss by virtue of an antiquated tax code when the drafters of MFDRA 
failed to foresee resulting consequences to homeowners who would be 
further crippled economically by selling underwater properties.51 MSSTs 
are likely to remain a permanent, necessary feature of the marketplace in 
many cities for quite some time into the future, especially given the 
millions of underwater properties that exist nine years after the 2007 
financial collapse. The government, therefore, must implement a long-
term solution to avoid disproportionally burdening lower and middle-class 
taxpayers with further financial hardship caused by tax liability to the 
government. 
III. THE RISE OF MORTGAGE SHORT SALE TRANSACTIONS 
The concept of MSSTs evolved in the residential real estate market 
in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis, which caused home values to 
plummet. Prior to that time, American homeowners were scarcely aware 
of the existence of MSSTs because the housing market generally 
maintained its values over the previous decades or saw less volatile 
declines than were seen during the Great Recession. Housing values that 
are underwater, or upside down, are also referred to as having negative 
equity value, a concept used to refer to assets that are worth less than the 
liability secured against the property.52 Some data exists regarding 
 
 49.  FORBATH, supra note 23, at 29 (citing Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the 
Renomination for the Presidency, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (June 27, 1936), in 5 PUBLIC PAPERS 
AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 234 (Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., 1938)). 
 50.  See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2.  
 51.  See infra notes 80-92, and accompanying text. 
 52.  As the leading global property information, analytics and data-enabled solutions provider, 
CoreLogic delivers unique property-level insights that power the global real estate economy 
company. See generally CORELOGIC, Negative Equity Report, http://www.corelogic.com/about-
us/researchtrends/equity-report.aspx#.VIxsLMJ0xOw (last visited Dec. 13, 2014). It produces a 
Negative Equity Report every quarter but appears not to have started doing so until after the financial 
crisis. Id. This report evidences the practical need to capture regularly these losses due to the 
significant devaluation of property after the 2007 financial crisis. Id. The Equity Report provides a 
quarterly overview of the distribution of equity across all U.S. single-family residential properties 
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negative equity real property values that lenders rely on to negotiate the 
terms upon which homeowners can sell their underwater homes through 
MSSTs. 
In the residential real estate mortgage context, the concept of the 
“short sale,” referred to here as MSST, does not have clear origins in 
scholastic literature, legal treatises, or tax laws prior to the 2007 financial 
crisis.53 According to at least one treatise, MSSTs are (private) two-party 
contractual transactions between lenders and their borrowers in which 
lenders allow borrowers54 to pay a reduced mortgage balance, typically 
based upon the current market value of the real property and what third-
party buyers are willing to pay to buy the property.55 For MSSTs, the 
property values are always worth less than the existing mortgage balances 
owed to lenders at the time the real estate sale transaction closes.56 
Lenders and homeowners negotiate MSSTs as arms-length transactions, 
but lenders are in the superior bargaining position57 because homeowners’ 
ability to sell underwater properties is subject to lenders’ sole discretion 
to accept reduced payoffs of mortgages. Thus, when lenders accept the 
reduced mortgage payoff, they agree to release their mortgage lien so that 
homeowners can sell the property free and clear to buyers. 
Under the MSST agreement, homeowners sell the underwater 
 
with a mortgage. Id. In addition to the comprehensive national snapshot, the report includes details 
for all states and the 25 largest metropolitan areas. Id. It is relied on by reputable financial and wealth 
medias, such as Forbes. See Carlyle, supra note 4. 
 53.  See MADISON, ET AL., supra note 8. 
 54.  Buyers of the property are not a part of MSSTs agreement—only the real estate transaction 
between homeowners/sellers of the property. Buyers typically enter into the real estate sale contract 
on the condition that the deal will only be consummated if sellers can successfully obtain lenders’ 
approval for MSSTs. See generally Stacey Vernallis, Short Sales: Full Disclosure Needed, 
REALTORMAG (Mar. 2010), http://realtormag.realtor.org/law-and-ethics/law/article/2010/03/short-
sales-full-disclosure-needed; see California Association of Realtors, Short Sale Addendum (Nov. 
2010), http://www.car.org/media/pdf/legal/standard-forms/478214/. 
 55.  In the author’s experience, the MSST agreements with lenders release borrowers from any 
further payment obligation in some cases, but in other instances, lenders may ask borrowers to agree 
to an unsecured loan by signing a promissory note for all or a portion of the loan balance that cannot 
be satisfied from the sales of the property. 
 56.  MSSTs are governed by contract law and state legislation. See generally MICHELLE KIRBY, 
OLR RESEARCH REPORT, 2013-R-0400, SHORT SALES (2013), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013-
R-0400.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2014) (discussing various states that are considering legislation 
regulating [residential] short sales transactions). The federal government has only provided guidelines 
for MSSTs under various loan modification programs. Id. See also HAFA, supra note 39.  
 57.  Typically, homeowners pay off their mortgages upon the sale of their homes through the 
proceeds at closing. At that time, lenders release the mortgage lien against the property, and the new 
buyer has clear title. When the sales proceeds are insufficient to pay off the mortgage balance, the 
risk is that the lender will not release the lien and no buyers or their purchase money mortgage lenders 
will want to take title to the property subject to a superior lien position. See generally Michael 
Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253, 253 (2009). 
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properties at the deflated current values that buyers in the market are 
willing to pay for the property. At the closing, homeowners use the sales 
proceeds from the real estate sales transaction to pay off the mortgage 
balance. Lenders specifically instruct the escrow company as to the 
conditions of the mortgage payoff, through instructions delivered to the 
escrow company, so that lenders also release the mortgage lien on the 
property upon payoff of the mortgage. If lenders do not agree to MSSTs, 
the real estate sales transactions cannot occur unless homeowners can 
afford to pay lenders the difference between the outstanding mortgage 
balance and the sales proceeds at the time of closing of the real estate 
transaction, which is a highly unlikely situation for financially distressed 
homeowners with underwater property. But once the closing concludes, 
the lender releases the mortgage lien and the homeowner is emancipated 
from mortgage and associated costs of homeownership. 
MSSTs are, arguably, beneficial to both lenders and borrowers. 
Some of the benefits of MSSTs for lenders and homeowners are tangible. 
For lenders, MSSTs aid them in receiving a substantial amount of the 
mortgage balance that they might not otherwise receive if homeowners 
default on their mortgages by not making monthly payments.58 
Homeowners benefit from being able to sell their underwater property in 
times of financial distress. However, the financial benefit of MSSTs is 
actual for lenders but illusory for homeowners because homeowners may 
end up substituting the payment of a tax liability for the mortgage 
payment. Given the federal tax consequences of the MSST that exists 
under current tax laws, the mortgage balance lenders forgive to allow 
MSSTs is treated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), under the tax 
code, as taxable income to homeowners. 
Homeowners with underwater properties are at a disadvantage 
because they do not know all of the alternatives to MSSTs and, thus, 
cannot weigh the benefits and disadvantages of each scenario as applied 
to their specific financial situation. In particular, they do not know that the 
existing tax law may not be favorable to them when selecting MSSTs. 
Although Congress twice renewed MFDRA, broadening the scope of its 
coverage would help millions of homeowners with underwater properties 
to receive relief the government promised and would eliminate the 
onerous tax consequences of the existing law, an inequity that the 
government must remedy. 
Subpart A analyzes the perceived, but illusory, benefits of MSSTs 
for homeowners, and contrasts the perceived benefits with the actual 
 
 58.  See MADISON, ET AL., supra note 8. 
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pitfalls of MSSTs, while discussing the tangible monetary benefits of 
MSSTs for Realtors and lenders. Subpart B highlights the disadvantages 
to homeowners when dealing with Realtors and lenders who are 
knowledgeable about the intricacies of MSSTs. Subpart C demonstrates 
the harsh implications of MSSTs for homeowners and suggests the 
alternatives of bankruptcy and foreclosure actions. Subpart D discusses 
the alternatives available to homeowners, specifically bankruptcy and 
foreclosure. Subpart E advocates that finding a solution to the MSST 
problem would boost the national economy. 
A. Tangible Benefits of MSSTs for Realtors and Lenders Versus Illusory 
Benefits for Homeowners 
The post-2007 financial crisis has forced lenders and Realtors to find 
ways to minimize their respective profit and losses in the sea of 
underwater properties that has surged into the residential real estate 
market. As a mechanism to aid the real estate sales market recovery and 
to mitigate losses to lenders, MSSTs solved the problem of selling 
devalued properties after the 2007 financial collapse. Lenders and 
Realtors cooperated to assist homeowners in selling underwater properties 
they could no longer afford through the use of MSSTs, and this seemed 
like the ultimate solution for lenders, Realtors, and homeowners. The 
motivations of the lenders and Realtors, however, were adverse to those 
of homeowners who could have sought other alternatives to MSSTs such 
as bankruptcy or foreclosure. 
For Realtors, using MSSTs presented a solution to the problem of a 
stagnant housing market with volumes of underwater properties, making 
it easier for homeowners to sell, and Realtors to maintain revenue streams 
through commissions. Lenders used MSSTs to avoid the costs and 
liabilities of the foreclosure process and subsequent ownership of 
properties.59 Lenders are not in the business of owning property, 
 
 59.  Lenders used short sales to trade a slow moving or greatly depreciated asset, in this case a 
mortgage loan, for liquidity. Nelse Thompson Miller, Short Sales Overview with an Emphasis on 
Broker Issues Until the Market Improves, More Property Owners Will Cut Their Losses and Move 
On, PRACT. REAL EST. LAW 9 (2010). Lenders do not want to carry too many properties on their REO 
(real estate-owned) books because they are not income-producing without monthly mortgage 
payments. Short Sale, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/real-estate-guides/foreclosure-
prevention/short-sale-to-stop-foreclosure/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2014). See generally REO and Bank-
Owned Properties: What You Need to Know, MY HOME BY FREDDIE MAC, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/homeownership/rent_or_buy/reo_bank_owned.html (last visited Dec. 
13, 2014). Real Estate Owned by Lenders is also referred to as REO Property. Id. Now the bank is 
the owner, and it has a different liability than it ever did as a lender. See generally Roberto Ceniceros, 
Foreclosures Create New Risks for Banks, BUSINESS INSURANCE (May 31, 2009), 
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especially underwater property that creates more liability risk than profit 
potential.60 Homeowners who sought to avoid default or relocate to other 
areas due to their personal financial crisis, such as income reduction or 
job loss, needed MSSTs to sell their homes to cut their financial losses.61 
While at first glance, the use of MSSTs seemed mutually beneficial to 
lenders, Realtors, homeowners, and, ultimately, the national economy that 
was in desperate need of recovery, homeowners received the least 
beneficial impact from MSSTs due to the federal tax liability created by 
MSSTs that neither lenders nor Realtors experienced. 
Lenders led the way to the real estate sales market recovery by 
approving MSSTs, which Realtors used to move the unprecedented 
number of underwater properties off the market. Motivated Realtors and 
lenders worked in tandem to sell underwater properties. In promoting the 
use of MSSTs to homeowners as a less detrimental option than 
foreclosure, lenders and Realtors disregarded the detrimental tax and 
consequential financial implications that homeowners face by entering 
into MSSTs. In addition to the potential tax liability, homeowners face the 
following: (a) negative credit reports; (b) the financial burden of upfront 
fees some lenders require before they approve MSSTs; (c) the costs of 
necessary repairs homeowners cannot afford to pay (either required by 
buyers or municipalities before the sale of the property); (d) significant 
loss of equity; and (e) potential other burdensome financial consequences. 
The real estate sales industry’s consequences for engaging in MSSTs 
were not grave at all by comparison to homeowners. Realtors were not 
parties to the actual MSSTs, although necessary for its success, because 
some lenders required homeowners to first attempt to sell the underwater 
property through a Realtor for a specified period, such as three to six 
months, before lenders would even consider MSSTs. Lenders agreed to 
pay Realtors their commissions once the real estate sales transaction 
closed. Thus, by listing the property, Realtors were able to provide market 
value comparisons, or “comps,” of the property compared to other sales 
in the market that lenders relied on when setting MSST mortgage payoff 
amounts. After the period for listing the property expired and by the time 
 
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20090531/ISSUE01/305319984; see also Patrick Barnard, 
Property Preservation, Longer Foreclosure Timelines Drive Demand for REO Insurance, SERVICING 
MANAGEMENT (Dec. 2013), http://www.mortgageorb.com/issues/SVM1312/FEAT_05_Longer-
Foreclosure-Timelines-Driving-Demand-For-REO-Insurance.html. 
 60.  See Miller, supra note 59. 
 61.  See generally Michael Babbitt, Erik Gerth & Mary McGrane, Workout of Home Mortgage 
Default, in 1 LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 3B:8 (Thompson Reuters 2014). From the 
perspective of homeowners, MSSTs avoid foreclosures and deficiency judgments, allowing them a 
fresh start without any continuing obligation to repay the loan under the note and mortgage. Id.  
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homeowners had missed several payments,62 lenders either began 
negotiations of MSST payoff amounts based on the existing value of the 
property, or waited until the homeowners actually entered into a real estate 
sales contract with a buyer, with the contract closing being conditioned on 
lender approval of an MSST. Homeowners and buyers then waited until 
lenders processed the homeowner’s information for the MSST, including 
income, financial statements, the real estate contract, Realtor comps, and 
any other information lenders deemed necessary in their assessment as to 
whether an MSST was in the lender’s best interest. Remember that 
Realtors and buyers are not involved in the actual MSSTs negotiations, 
only homeowners and lenders. Thus, if the real estate deal falls through 
because lenders do not approve MSSTs, buyers do not suffer any damages 
because of the conditional contract and Realtors do not have any loss 
except the potential commissions (typically, commissions are not 
guaranteed payments under the real estate sales contract by either sellers 
or buyers until all contract conditions are met allowing the transaction to 
close). Homeowners, however, face adverse consequences if their need to 
sell the property is necessary for their financial viability. 
Realtors’ motivations to make a commission would have outweighed 
the need for homeowners to consider other viable alternatives, including 
bankruptcy or foreclosure—possible acceptable options that might have 
been more beneficial for homeowners to consider in lieu of an MSST.63 
Either foreclosure or bankruptcy might have had a less detrimental 
financial impact than the federal tax liability created by an MSST. 
Another possible benefit for homeowners choosing to allow foreclosure 
on the property would be anti-deficiency judgment statutes in a minority 
of states. Anti-deficiency judgment statutes forbid lenders from collecting 
deficiency judgments against homeowners in the event of foreclosure 
without tax consequences. For states without anti-deficiency judgment 
statutes, when foreclosures are coupled with bankruptcy, homeowners in 
bankruptcy avoid deficiency judgments because once the foreclosure 
court enters the deficiency judgment, the lender becomes an unsecured 
creditor, and that unsecured debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy court.64 
Under these circumstances, homeowners would still have negative credit 
ratings for choosing an MSST, foreclosure, or bankruptcy, but MSSTs 
have lingering financial effects because of the tax liability. Given the 
 
 62.  Miller, supra note 59. “Lenders usually require the seller [homeowner] be in arrears on 
payments for a few months before considering a short sale.” Id.  
 63.  See supra Part II.A 
 64.  See generally Using Bankruptcy to Provide Relief From Tax Debt, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE (2013), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2013_NTF_Bankruptcy_Relief.pdf. 
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complexities of the laws, both non-tax and tax-related, and the 
information asymmetry between lenders, Realtors and homeowners, 
homeowners were at a disadvantage by not knowing the best alternatives 
to sell their underwater property, and more importantly, the implications 
that advantaged and disadvantaged them.65 
Lenders were motivated to use MSSTs, not to make profits, like 
commissions, but to avoid additional losses on the mortgages they held. 
Lenders maximized the profits for investors by securitizing mortgages.66 
To minimize the losses on defaulted mortgages across various high-risk 
tranches in these securities, known as mortgage-backed securities 
(MBSs), lenders used MSSTs in lieu of foreclosures. In many instances, 
foreclosure was a more costly and time consuming mechanism for 
minimizing loss of profits for investors. Furthermore, lenders and 
investors who held MBSs potentially faced significant losses from 
uncollectable toxic mortgage products with more risk of borrowers 
defaulting. MSSTs could help to mitigate those losses and avoid liabilities 
associated with defaulted mortgages in at least three areas.67 
The first liability area relates to the defaulting toxic mortgage 
products lenders placed in the real estate lending market and includes the 
costs or liabilities68 associated with the foreclosure process.69 In judicial 
foreclosure jurisdictions,70 lenders did not want to initiate judicial 
foreclosure actions,71 especially with the significant costs associated with 
litigation and the strict procedural rules that prolonged the foreclosure 
 
 65.  Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual 
Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 660-62 (2009). 
 66.  See Kristin N. Johnson, From Diagnosing the Dilemma to Divining a Cure: Post-Crisis 
Regulation of Financial Markets, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1299, 1306-07 (2010).  
 67.  See ALVIN L. ARNOLD, MORTGAGE AND REAL ESTATE EXECUTIVES REPORT (2011). The 
overall difficulty with MSSTs is that mortgage servicers of collateralized mortgage securities, often 
referred to as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) or mortgage backed securities (MBSs), need to 
obtain approval for MSSTs from pools of investors, a process which has proved inefficient at best, 
taking a few weeks to a couple of months. See generally Johnson, supra note 66.  
 68.  Once lenders file for foreclosure and pay court costs and attorneys’ fees, lenders must then 
secure the property if the property is vacant, maintain forced property and liability insurance on the 
property, and pay or redeem any real estate taxes to avoid tax sales that could grant title to another 
owner. See Miller, supra note 59, at 9-10 (Noting that short sales are more attractive and less 
expensive than foreclosures). See generally ARNOLD, supra note 67. 
 69.  ARNOLD, supra note 67. 
 70.  In non-judicial foreclosure states, the delays may be less significant, but homeowners may 
still be able to ask for court intervention. See Department of Consumer and Business Services, Where 
to Get Help, OREGON.GOV, http://www.oregon.gov/DCBS/foreclosure/Pages/where-to-get-help.aspx 
(last visited May 17, 2016). 
 71.  In non-judicial foreclosures, on the other hand, lenders have lower costs because no court 
action or delays are involved unless homeowners change the process. Id. 
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process.72 Lenders expended an average of 40% loss of the mortgage loan 
balance when lenders foreclosed versus less than half that loss, at 19%, 
through MSSTs.73 MSSTs, alternatively, saved lenders money and time 
by avoiding the mandatory, complex procedures associated with 
foreclosures. With foreclosures, lenders face significant delays in gaining 
court-ordered possession of the property even after a judicial foreclosure 
sale, especially if borrowers engage in motion practice in court hearings 
and in continuances that extend the time of the court proceedings to allow 
homeowners additional time to continue to reside in the property until 
finding somewhere to relocate.74 In addition, as the new property owner 
following foreclosure, lenders have to bear the liability and costs of 
owning the property. 
Thus, the second area of liability is the costs associated with the 
responsibilities of property ownership once the foreclosure process is 
final. Lenders are in the business of lending money to buy homes, not 
owning homes themselves.75 Once lenders become owners, the additional 
costs post-foreclosure include: (a) holding the unpaid mortgage for which 
no income will derive;76 (b) purchasing property and liability insurance to 
cover potential damage to the property and third parties; (c) paying local 
 
 72.  Miller, supra note 59. 
 73.  According to an analysis in 2008 by Clayton Holdings, Inc., a firm that tracks mortgage 
loans for investors, for an MSST, lenders do not have to pay “carrying costs.” Id. If the lender were 
to foreclose on the property instead of allowing an MSST, the lender incurs significant costs including 
court filing fees, service of process costs, legal fees, foreclosure related costs (notice, auction, and 
other fees), maintenance fees (when the property has been abandoned by the homeowner), insurance, 
and real estate taxes. Id. Thus, if lenders cooperate and approve an MSST, they save money. Id. 
 74.  In practice, courts allow pro se borrowers and borrowers with attorneys time to mediate 
with lenders, which delays the foreclosure case. During the height of the foreclosure crisis, in some 
jurisdictions, court dockets were so overwhelmed with foreclosure actions that courts set up mediation 
programs to deal with the volume of cases. See Paul Jackson, Overwhelmed Illinois Court Postpones 
Foreclosures Until September, HOUSING WIRE (Apr. 16, 2009), 
http://www.housingwire.com/articles/overwhelmed-illinois-court-postpones-foreclosures-until-
september. 
 75.  In addition, lenders could face liability exposures, in tort for injury to parties in the property 
or from local government actions for maintenance, taxes, or securing the property. Lenders also must 
keep sufficient capital reserves for the outstanding mortgage balance until it is paid-off. Lenders also 
face maintenance costs and issues for vacant properties, especially in blight communities. When 
selling a foreclosed property, lenders must be careful to waive all warranties upon contract or face a 
breach with potential buyers. See Ilyce Glink & Samuel Tamkin, Short sales and deficiency 
judgments: What you need to know, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 21, 2012), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-12-21/marketplace/sns-201212161100—tms—
realestmctnig-a20121221-20121221_1_mortgage-lender-short-sale-forgiven-debt.  
 76.  From my practical experience, lenders are typically the only buyer at the foreclosure sale 
of the property and, thus, buy the property for the value of their own mortgage balance. In better real 
estate markets, the hope is that they can quickly resell the property for a profit or cut their losses from 
holding the property until it sells.  
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real estate taxes and assessments; and (d) assuring general maintenance of 
the property to avoid deterioration of vacant property. Lenders do not 
make money for their investors by holding properties that produce no 
revenues while expending money to pay for the cost of ownership of 
properties. MSSTs minimize the time during which lenders realize losses. 
The third liability area involves lenders’ liability exposure as sellers 
of the properties. After acquiring title to the property post-foreclosure, 
lenders seek to resell properties as quickly as possible because of the costs 
of ownership stated above. In addition, when lenders become sellers of 
properties, they expose themselves to all the potential contractual 
responsibilities that any seller of property assumes. While lenders 
predominately require their prospective buyers to waive almost all 
warranties and representations as a condition of the sale, lenders who are 
owners cannot waive federal and state required laws, including disclosure 
laws, and lenders may, thus, become liable for non-compliance or 
violation of statutory requirements. MSSTs allow lenders to avoid this set 
of potential liabilities associated with selling properties when existing 
homeowners facilitate the sale of the property.77 This allows lenders to 
save money and to avoid contract-based liability issues.78 
The cooperation between lenders and borrowers through MSSTs 
may allow for a quicker turnaround of the sale between homeowners and 
prospective third-party buyers. In the best case, homeowners who stay in 
the property also maintain the property so that the value does not drop 
further due to deterioration of the property. Lenders benefit from a better 
chance of having a substantial amount of its mortgage paid off if they 
cooperate with homeowners who assist in the sale of the property, remain 
in legal title, and occupy and maintain the property pending the sale. 
Lenders, as legal title owners, who then must sell the property, run the risk 
that prospective buyers may not close on the real estate contracts at all and 
that the property remains vacant, subjecting lenders to further liability as 
the owner of record, especially to municipalities who require the property 
be safely maintained.79 
 
 77.  See generally Leigh Thompson, Do Mortgage Lenders Prefer to Do a Short Sale or a 
Foreclosure?, SFGATE: HOME GUIDES, http://homeguides.sfgate.com/mortgage-lenders-prefer-
short-sale-foreclosure-49815.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2016).  
 78.  Lender costs associated with MSSTs include internal administrative services or fees 
already contracted with a mortgage servicing company for the additional service of facilitating the 
MSST. See also Julie Schmit, Lenders Embrace More Short Sales, USA TODAY (Feb. 19, 2012), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/MONEY/usaedition/2012-02-20-Short-sales-_ST_U.htm.  
 79.  Jonathan Stempel, Lawsuit Accuses Wells Fargo of Biased Lending in Chicago Area, 
REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2014, 7:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wellsfargo-chicago-lawsuit-
idUSKCN0JC24020141129. See also BofA, Citi, Wells Fargo Accused Of Lending Discrimination In 
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For lenders and Realtors, the actual benefits, or liability avoidance, 
through MSSTs make these transactions less risky. For homeowners, 
while tangible benefits seem to be the sale of the underwater property and 
relief from paying the mortgage, the benefits have an illusory effect 
because inequity arises for homeowners resulting from MSSTs from 
which they might not so easily recover, specifically financial hardship 
from federal tax consequences. Recognizing this inequity, Congress has 
attempted to address it but only in a very narrow scope that still leaves 
homeowners exposed to federal tax liability. 
B. Inequity of the MSSTs 
The public policies that the federal government adopts to protect 
homeowners are essential for the future economic stability of the national 
economy.80 Policymakers must take into consideration ways to balance 
inequities to citizens when new laws create a disparity among taxpayers 
legitimately deserving relief, as has been the case with the MFRDA. 
Following the 2007 financial crisis, the introduction into the real estate 
sales market81 of the MSST method of selling underwater properties 
created financial risk for unsuspecting homeowners selling their 
properties. This financial risk was the federal tax liability created for 
homeowners who used MSSTs to sell their property. In 2007, without any 
apparent opposition from lenders or Realtors who promoted the use of 
MSSTs,82 the U.S. Congress responded with legislation to provide 
temporary tax relief for homeowners83 who faced tax liability for 
 
Miami Suit, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/19/miami-
borrower-discrimination_n_4475985.html. 
 80.  DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 20. The strength of 
American democracy lies in its social values, on the way they influence public choice, and how they 
are reflected in public policies. Id.  
 81.  See Valenza, supra note 9.  
 82.  The lending industry had no true opposition to this type of government aid for taxpayers 
primarily because the relief for taxpayers did not impact lenders’ ability to avoid or mitigate their 
liabilities in the residential real estate market through the use of MSSTs. In fact, the new law helped 
lenders increase the payoff of bad mortgages on their books. See generally Laurie Goodman & Ellen 
Seidman, The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act Has Expired—Renewal Could Benefit Millions, 
URBAN INSTITUTE: HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER COMMENTARY 6 (Feb. 17, 2014), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413025-Mortgage-Forgiveness-Debt-Relief-Act-Has-
Expired.pdf. 
 83.  For example, short sales were virtually unknown in California prior to 2007. See Valenza, 
supra note 9. See also BILL ANALYSIS, SENATE BILL 412, supra note 13, (As reported by the U.S. 
Senate, according to the California Association of Realtors, there were approximately 110,000 short 
sales in California during 2010, up from approximately 90,000 during 2009, a few thousand in 2008, 
and a negligible amount in 2007.).  
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engaging in MSSTs.84 
Congress passed the tax relief act known as the Mortgage 
Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 (MFDRA).85 The MFDRA was 
intended to address the tax implications for homeowners of using the 
MSST vehicle, but, as I detail in Part V below, the MFDRA was too 
narrow in scope and application to provide significant relief to the range 
of homeowners with underwater property. In Part V, I propose means by 
which Congress can provide the necessary pragmatic relief to the full 
range of homeowners. This section, however, will discuss the nature of 
relief provided to homeowners under the MFDRA and will suggest that 
Congress make the following changes: (1) extension of the amount of time 
for relief to be afforded; (2) tax relief for secondary residences similar to 
that for principal residences; and (3) better tax relief protection for 
homeowners when they put a residence on the market. 
Congress passed MFDRA to address the harm that would arise with 
lenders’ widespread use of MSSTs. The intent was to allow homeowners 
to sell their underwater homes with some tax relief. Under the tax laws 
prior to MFDRA, for any forgiven debt by a creditor, the IRS classified 
the forgiven debt as taxable income to the taxpayer. The reduction of debt 
that lenders forgave to allow MSSTs, thus, caused a shadow increase in 
taxable income for homeowners. Taxpayers included the forgiven 
indebtedness as income in their Adjusted Gross Income, which was then 
subject to tax under the taxpayers’ applicable tax rate. The forgiven 
indebtedness, therefore, created an additional tax liability.86 In 2007, 
 
 84.  It was not long after the 2007 financial collapse that policymakers addressed this inequity 
for taxpayers trying to sell their underwater properties. See Fact Sheet: The Mortgage Forgiveness 
Debt Relief Act of 2007, THE WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 20, 2007), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071220-6.html (citing President George W. Bush 
on Sep. 1, 2007: “When your home is losing value and your family is under financial stress, the last 
thing you need is to be hit with higher taxes. So I’m working with members of both parties to pass a 
bill that will protect homeowners from having to pay taxes on cancelled mortgage debt.”). Id. Such 
action by the U.S. Congress seemed apropos to aid homeowners drowning in the underwater real 
estate market and, especially after Congress gave national banks that held mortgages a monumental 
amount of funds to recover from the mortgage market collapse, through the Trouble Assets Relief 
Program (TARP). See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 1-
303, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008); Porter, Pawns for a Higher Greed, supra note 25. 
 85.  I.R.C. § 108 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). The section, in its entirety, 
includes: discharge of indebtedness exclusion from gross income for bankruptcy, insolvency, 
qualified farm indebtedness, qualified real property indebtedness, and qualified principal residence 
indebtedness before January 1, 2015. As of December 31, 2014, Congress extended MDFRA to apply 
to taxpayers filing 2014 tax returns who sold a home between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 
2014. See H.R. 3856 (113th): Homeowners Debt Relief Extension Act of 2014, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr3856 (last visited Dec. 8, 2014). In December 2015, 
MDFRA was extended through the end of 2016. Ricci, supra note 3. 
 86.  Lenders faced no such tax consequences because the tax laws for businesses, such as large 
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when lenders were entering into MSSTs to allow homeowners to sell their 
underwater properties, in extreme situations, lenders were forgiving 
hundreds of thousands of dollars of debt under mortgages, creating a 
potentially devastating tax burden for taxpayers. In addition to the 
potential tax liability concern, property sales under the poor national 
economic climate became stagnant, and the saturation of underwater 
homes in the market, plus the mortgage-lending freeze, made it impossible 
for taxpayers to sell their homes without lenders’ approval of MSSTs. 
MFDRA’s terms, however, were too narrow and failed to account 
for, and adjust to, the evolving landscape of underwater properties in the 
real estate market.87 The law was too narrow as to its coverage period, its 
scope of eligible taxpayers, and its flexibility to changes in the real estate 
market during the volatile recovery period long after the 2007 financial 
collapse, during the Great Recession, and even nine years later. The 
underwater properties in the real estate market did and still do require a 
broader scope of MFDRA. During the years after MFDRA became 
effective, a variety of scenarios for taxpayers with principal and secondary 
residences morphed in a distressed residential real estate landscape. 
First, Congress only intended MFDRA to be temporary tax relief for 
homeowners who faced potential tax burdens for engaging in MSSTs. 
MFDRA, originally applied to debt forgiven by lenders through MSSTs 
in calendar years 2008 through 2010, but has now been extended three 
times, with the most recent extension by President Barack Obama in 
December 2015 for an additional year to cover tax year 2016. Given the 
statistics in 2015, almost 10 million homes nationwide that are currently 
underwater, Congress’s one-year extension will not have the impact of 
protecting taxpayers in the long term given the continued fallout of the 
financial crisis,88 which will continue well beyond 2016. 
Second, MFDRA failed to take into account owners of underwater 
secondary residences.89 MFDRA provides tax relief for only those 
 
lenders, are uniquely different from those affecting individual taxpayers. For lenders, the reduction in 
debt was a deduction as an ordinary business loss, or capital loss depending on the tax rules, that 
created no taxable income event. As a result, the MSST created an inequity in which the government 
could tax individual taxpayers but not lenders. See generally IRS, https://www.irs.gov (detailing 
business and corporation tax rules). 
 87.  See BILL ANALYSIS, SENATE BILL 412, supra note 13.  
 88.  Florida, for example, has in excess of 1 million of those properties. Harwell, supra note 4; 
Barringer, supra note 4.  
 89.  During the mortgage boom, secondary home purchases increased at a significant rate, 
although not at the ridiculous pace of primary homes purchases. See generally Ing-Haw Cheng, Sahil 
Raina, & Wei Xiong, Wall Street and the Housing Bubble, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2797 (2014), 
available at https://www.princeton.edu/~wxiong/papers/WallStreet.pdf (discussing Americans 
investing in second and investment properties). The statistics are difficult to find for secondary homes 
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taxpayers who sold or sell their principal residence properties through 
MSSTs. MFDRA does not allow for tax relief for secondary homes. 
Congress’s passage of MFDRA, however, should have taken into account 
the unfairness in not offering broad enough tax relief to solvent middle-
class taxpaying homeowners whom lenders and the tax laws incentivized 
to invest in secondary residences. Millions of homeowners invested in 
secondary homes during the mortgage boom because of favorable lending 
standards.90 New tax laws that deal with MSSTs should give taxpayers the 
option of selecting MFRDA relief for either principal or secondary 
residences, which would at least give taxpayers some flexibility in how to 
best mitigate the financial distress from owning these types of underwater 
properties. Even though a secondary home, as defined by tax law, is only 
occupied by the homeowner for finite periods during the year, the existing 
tax laws have always given both principal and secondary homes the same 
treatment for tax deduction purposes. The tax code provides the exact 
same tax treatment for secondary homes as principal residences for 
mortgage interest and real estate tax deductions.91 Even though both 
principal and secondary homes suffered staggering devaluation,92 only 
homeowners with principal residences could sell their properties through 
MSSTs and exclude the debt that lenders forgave from their taxable 
income.93 With the exclusion limitations under MFDRA as to the amount 
of forgiven debt taxpayers could exclude from taxable income,94 
 
sales, especially those sold as MSSTs, but the market for these homes existed from 2000 to 2007, 
well before the financial crisis. 
 90.  Many homeowners entered the secondary residence market, especially with available 
mortgages lenders provided and with the ability to deduct the interest and real estate taxes just as they 
did for their mortgages on their primary residences. Thus, the secondary home market grew with the 
hope of many existing homeowners of having retirement homes in warmer climates or an investment 
for future inheritance or use. Daria Kelly Uhlig, The Advantages & Disadvantages of Buying a Second 
Home, SFGATE: HOME GUIDES, http://homeguides.sfgate.com/advantages-disadvantages-buying-
second-home-50334.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2016). See also Why Have a Second Home?, DISCOVER 
(Jul. 26, 2014), https://www.discover.com/home-loans/blog/why-have-a-second-home. 
 91.  I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15).  
 92.  There is scarce data or information in the market for second homes but several warmer 
region states are notorious for second home purchases including Arizona, Florida, Nevada, and 
Southern California. 
 93.  In a normal market where property values exceed mortgage balances, § 121 of the Tax 
Code would allow homeowners to exclude gains from the sale of primary residences up to $250,000 
for single taxpayers and $500,000 for married taxpayers. I.R.C. § 121 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, 
approved 12/28/15). The same is not true for the sale of secondary residences. Id.  
 94.  The federal exclusion applies to qualified principal residence indebtedness with a $2 
million limit ($1 million for a married taxpayer filing a separate return). I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) (LEXIS, 
through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). Some states promulgated tax laws that mirrored MDFRA. 
Now passed into law, Assembly Bill 1393, introduced by Henry Perea, D-Fresno, amends California’s 
tax code so that homeowners do not have to report as income certain debt that was canceled or 
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classification of the property as principal or secondary should not be the 
deciding factor. Instead, Congress should allow those homeowners to 
choose the MSST property to which they will apply the tax relief. The 
impact on potential lost tax revenues for the government would not be 
affected by their choice, but the option would have a significant impact in 
allowing a broader scope of homeowners with underwater property to 
improve their financial positions, especially those whose only option is to 
use MSSTs to sell those underwater properties. 
Third, MFDRA is inflexible to changes in the real estate market 
landscape for taxpayers who owned underwater property that they 
originally may have classified as their principal residence, but, due to 
personal economic circumstances and the stagnancy in real estate market, 
the property no longer qualifies as a principal residence under the IRS 
occupancy rules for tax purpose. Homeowners who move out of the 
property or rent it to mitigate their financial losses could find themselves 
not qualifying for MFDRA tax relief if they ultimately sell the property 
through MSSTs. Many homeowners are forced to vacate properties they 
cannot sell due to volatile market conditions, which forced them to leave 
their properties to relocate for better job opportunities,95 or because of 
economic distress from income reduction or job loss.96 To mitigate the 
financial distress or avoid defaulting on their mortgage loans, 
homeowners rented principal residences until the market recovered so 
they either could sell the homes under better property value conditions or 
stabilize their financial distress to be able to afford living in the residence 
again.97 Under MFDRA, once the home is no longer one’s principal 
 
forgiven by a lender due to principal reduction from a loan modification. See Evan Nemeroff, Calif. 
Law Covers Lapse in Mortgage Forgiveness Tax Protection, NATIONAL MORTGAGE NEWS (Jul. 22, 
2014), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/regulation/calif-law-covers-lapse-in-mortgage-
forgiveness-tax-protection-1042192-1.html. 
 95.  See generally Christopher J. Goodman & Steven M. Mance, Employment loss and the 
2007-09 Recession: An Overview, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2011), 
http://www.bls.gov/mlr/2011/04/art1full.pdf.  
 96.  The financial crisis also affected ancillary industries that collapsed due to the mortgage 
crisis, bank closings, lenders downsizing staff, construction industry, real estate market professionals, 
among other causes. See generally Amir Sufi & Atif Mian, Why the Housing Bubble Tanked the 
Economy and the Tech Bubble Didn’t, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 12, 2014, 6:03 AM), 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-the-housing-bubble-tanked-the-economy-and-the-tech-
bubble-didnt/. 
 97.  This scenario distinguishes those investors who purchased property not to occupyy it but 
for profit through flipping or rental and who designated such properties as business investments for 
tax purposes. The risks taken by those investors are not the conservative risks anticipated by 
borrowers who buy property for personal residences. Leonard Baron, Rental Property Investing 101—
Tips for Future Property Moguls, FOX BUSINESS, (Apr. 23, 2012), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2012/04/23/rental-property-investing-101-tips-for-
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residence, the law does not provide tax relief for MSSTs forgiven 
indebtedness. Given homeowners’ inability to sell their homes in a 
depressed real estate sales market, for several years in many cases, and 
the need for economic recovery from their personal financial crisis in the 
Great Recession, the law should extend protection to this class of 
homeowners whose principal residence changed classification due to 
market conditions after the financial crisis. 
These circumstances justify policymakers modifying MFDRA, or 
other existing tax laws, in order to address the gross inequities in tax relief 
these homeowners face. Underwater homeowners and those who sold 
underwater property through 2014, which property was not a qualified 
principal residence, potentially face a rude awakening even with 
Congress’s latest extension of the law. Congress has not provided broad 
enough tax relief coverage of MFDRA for the various scenarios that are 
ongoing many years after the financial crisis. These consequences were 
reasonably foreseeable under MDFRA, especially as Congress was 
considering the extensions of the law. If the objective of MFDRA was to 
aid taxpayers, policymakers should have kept up with the changing 
circumstances and should have modified the type of aid to fit what would 
truly help homeowners in the existing real estate market.98 The impact of 
the qualified principal residence requirement could financially devastate 
many American taxpayers who perceived that they escaped the burdens 
of owning underwater property. 
For the millions of American homeowners with underwater property, 
the impact of the potential federal tax liability could result in a further 
crisis of civic consciousness.99 The government’s adoption of tax policies 
to protect its citizen homeowners is essential for the future stability of the 
national economy upon which all Americans thrive or perish.100 Citizens 
perceive that the government passed laws like MFDRA to aid them, not 
harm them. When the law imposes further financial burden for citizens, 
the resulting hardship perpetuates the lack of confidence Americans have 
in our government’s ability to protect its citizens. 
 
future-property-moguls/.  
 98.  Significant property devaluation has plagued many communities but disproportionately 
affects blacks, Latinos and other minority group communities. See DEIER ET AL., supra note 2. 
 99.  William M. Rohe & Mark Lindblad, Reexamining the Social Benefits of Homeownership 
After the Housing Crisis, HARVARD UNIVERSITY: JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES (Aug. 2013), 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/hbtl-04.pdf.  
 100.  FCIC REPORT, supra note 2. 
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C. The Implications of Alternatives to MSSTs 
Financially distressed homeowners who own underwater properties 
perceive MSSTs as a more favorable method to sell their homes than the 
threat of forcibly losing their homes to foreclosure. Homeowners may 
perceive that lenders created, in the MSST, an alternative process that 
could help them out of the distressed property that they would otherwise 
not be able to continue to afford or to incentivize the sale of an underwater 
property that had been on the market for a long duration. However, the 
neighborhoods of homeowners who remained in their underwater 
properties, neighborhoods saturated with properties in foreclosure, 
became less than desirable for homeowners and their families to continue 
living in.101 Whatever the reasons homeowners used MSSTs to sell their 
homes, other than a sentence in a real estate contract, it is highly probable 
that neither the lenders nor Realtors discussed the potential tax liabilities 
associated with engaging in MSSTs. The government also fell short of 
ensuring homeowners understood the consequences of not strictly 
complying with provisions of MFDRA. 
Homeowners perceived lenders who promoted government-
approved programs as rescuers of distressed homeowners who owned 
underwater properties because homeowners now could sell their homes or 
modify their mortgage loans. This rescuer perception was misplaced. 
Without understanding the tax and financial implications of engaging in 
MSSTs, homeowners perceived that lenders’ approval of MSSTs allowed 
them to voluntarily participate in the sale of the property, to vacate the 
property on favorable terms, and to negotiate with lenders. This voluntary 
participation appeared more favorable to homeowners than the distress of 
a foreclosure action.102 For homeowners, unfortunately, the motivations 
of lenders and borrowers for engaging in MSSTs are incongruent. Even 
though the ultimate goal of selling the property and paying off the 
mortgage offers some benefits for both homeowners and lenders, the 
implications of doing so are inequitably balanced against homeowners, 
especially given the current tax law regime, best seen through an example, 
such as the following: 
A homeowner sells an underwater home with a current market value of 
$100,000. The original property value was $150,000. The mortgage loan 
 
 101.  Blighted communities resulted from mass foreclosures. See generally David Streitfeld, 
Blight Moves in After Foreclosures, LA TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/la-fi-vacant28aug28-
story.html#page=1 (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).  
 102.  Babbit, et al., supra note 61.  
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balance at the time of the MSST is $120,000 (based on an original pur-
chase price of $150,000 where the homeowner paid 20 percent, or 
$30,000, as a down payment).103 The lender must agree to approve the 
MSST for at least $100,000, the price a willing buyer may pay given the 
current market value of the property, but more likely would pay less or 
shop for other properties where homeowners and their lenders are will-
ing to negotiate for less than the current depressed market value. The 
lender must forgive $20,000 of the $120,000 mortgage loan balance in 
order for the homeowner to sell the property. In addition to the mortgage 
payoff, the homeowner, however, has additional costs associated with 
closing the real estate transaction, such as Realtor commissions and fees, 
title/escrow company fees, local government fees and real estate taxes, 
county recording fees, and other related transaction fees. If these costs 
are an additional estimated $12,000,104 the homeowners will need to 
come up with the money to pay them at closing or the lender will have 
to pay them and accept less than $100,000 of the sales price as the pay-
off. The latter is more likely because distressed homeowners are typi-
cally unable to come up with the money to pay off the additional costs 
at closing. If the lender does not agree to pay the additional closing costs, 
the MSST cannot occur under the lender’s terms. For homeowners una-
ble to afford to continue paying the mortgage, the inability to sell the 
property may possibly result in the lender filing a foreclosure action. 
Given the significant financial loss lenders incur in foreclosures, 
almost double the costs of MSSTs,105 the lender would likely better 
benefit by approving the MSST and accepting whatever sales proceeds 
are available after closing. Thus, the lender will accept an amount taking 
into account the additional costs, which the borrower cannot pay to 
facilitate the closing. In this case, the homeowner walks away without 
 
 103.  For this example, one needs to do amortization values for 7 years and with interest rate 
calculated and resources on average devalued price of property in certain areas. See LOAN 
AMORTIZATION TABLE CALCULATOR, http://www.amortizationtable.org/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).  
 104.  Seller’s costs that might not be paid by another source based on a $100,000 purchase price 
include Realtor’s commission at as high as 7% in some jurisdictions ($7,000), unpaid real estate taxes 
or back taxes if the homeowner has not paid them is estimated at 2.5% of the property value ($2,500), 
title/escrow fees for owner’s policy and associated fees for certain title coverages, recording fees, 
appraisals, government taxes or other liens, etc. ($1,000), and maintenance or repair related credits 
seller is responsible for paying ($1,500). 
 105.  Theoretically, at 40% of the $120,000 mortgage balance, the lender will pay 40% in costs 
associated with a foreclosure, or $48,000, receiving only $52,000 ($120,000 - $20,000 - $48,000). At 
19% in cost in an MSST, the lender will pay $22,800 in costs, receiving $77,200 ($120,000 - $20,000 
- $22,800). If this example was an actual deal with only $20,000 underwater in the property value 
versus the mortgage loan, then the lender receives $88,000 ($120,000 - $20,000 - $12,000). In either 
MSST situation, the lender saves money by engaging in an MSST rather than pursing foreclosure, 
both in finance terms and time saved. See LOAN AMORTIZATION TABLE CALCULATOR, 
http://www.amortizationtable.org/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).  
31
Porter: The Quagmire of Mortgage Short Sale Transactions
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
2 - PORTER MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  12:32 PM 
844 AKRON LAW REVIEW [49:813 
owing the lender, but tax consequences may arise because the lender has 
forgiven $32,000 of the mortgage indebtedness,106 resulting from the 
MSST—$20,000 of the loan balance plus $12,000 to pay costs, and only 
receiving $88,000 in proceeds from the sale to pay off the original 
$120,000 mortgage balance. The homeowner experiences the benefit of 
the sale of the property and is emancipated from paying the mortgage and 
owing the lender, but the borrower may now face federal tax liability 
based on $32,000 of taxable income, unless the law excludes the forgiven 
loan balance from taxable income. MFDRA provided that exclusion only 
for those homeowners who sold a qualified principal residence from 2007 
to 2014. For homeowners with secondary residences, under the same 
scenario, the forgiven indebtedness of $32,000 is treated as taxable 
income. Lenders, overall, have greater benefit than homeowners in using 
an MSST because borrowers/sellers do all the work to consummate the 
real estate sales transaction, borrowers must deal with adverse tax 
treatment or find ways to avoid it, and borrowers remain subject to all the 
costs and liabilities associated with homeownership until the sale 
concludes. 
Millions of borrowers with underwater properties are unaware that 
they have options for avoiding the tax liability and deficiency 
judgments,107 (1) by allowing foreclosure on the property;108 (2) by 
signing an unsecured, recourse note for the $32,000 and repaying the 
lender the short amount from the sale over a period of years;109 (3) by, 
 
 106.  The $32,000 is calculated by deducting the $20,000 forgiven debt balance owed on the 
original outstanding $120,000 mortgage balance (based on the $100,000 sale price), then deducting 
$12,000 in seller related closing costs. Thus, the lender will only receive $88,000 ($120,000 - 
$20,0000 - $12,000) of the outstanding loan under an MSST.  
 107.  Anti-deficiency judgment legislation in some states evidences strong public policy against 
placing the burden on consumers for loan products introduced into the market. The California 
legislature’s primary purpose for passing its anti-deficiency judgment statute was to prevent the 
overvaluation of property by placing the risk of inadequate security on lenders to discourage risky 
lending practices and precarious land schemes. See Spangler v. Memel, 498 P.2d 1055, 1060-62 (Cal. 
1972). California law also forbids consumers from waiving the anti-deficiency protections either at 
the time the loan is made or in a forbearance agreement, such as through an MSST. CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 580(b) (LEXIS, through Chapter 1 of the 2016 Session). See generally Jackson v. Taylor, 
272 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5 (1969); see also Thompson v. Allert, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1462, 1466-67 (1991); 
Palm v. Schilling, 199 Cal. App. 3d 63, 69 (1988). 
 108.  In states without deficiency judgment statutes, the amount could be dischargeable in 
bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A § 727 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). 
 109.  Mortgage payment of $1500 then repayment of unsecured debt estimated at $650 for 5 
years, under current laws. See generally Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure 
Act of 2009, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f. However, lenders 
may be unwilling to enter into an unsecured debt with financially distressed borrowers who have an 
inability to pay, and would prefer an MSST versus pursuing a more costly foreclosure process. The 
MSST option does not have as significant of an impact on the borrower’s credit because borrowers 
32
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss4/2
2 - PORTER MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  12:32 PM 
2016] THE QUAGMIRE OF MORTGAGE SHORT SALE TRANSACTIONS 845 
under certain circumstances, negotiating with the lender for a deed in lieu 
of foreclosure in full satisfaction of the mortgage amount;110 or (4) by 
filing bankruptcy.111 The second and third options, however, are at the 
lender’s discretion, much like MSSTs, and a lender would agree to them 
only if the options provide more substantial benefit to the lender than an 
MSST. The options allow homeowners to dispose of underwater principal 
and secondary residences, or other underwater property as well. Although 
homeowners suffer negative credit rating implications in all these 
scenarios, just as with MSSTs,112 borrowers can financially recover and, 
importantly, avoid the significant financial burdens associated with tax 
liability that could plague them for many years. This Article does not 
mean to suggest that bankruptcy and foreclosure are uniformly available 
or uniformly desirable. As I note in the next section, they are not. 
Nevertheless, homeowners should have complete information regarding 
each option for dealing with underwater properties. 
 
can negotiate with lenders to report to credit agencies that the loan has been satisfied, as agreed. 
MSSTs and foreclosure both have negative impact on credit reports, up to 7 years, and bankruptcy up 
to 10 years. In either situation, borrowers incur time to recover financial without owing the IRS for 
taxes and penalties, subject to onerous collection methods.  
 110.  The deed in lieu (DIL) of foreclosure method is available from lenders and allows 
homeowners to negotiate with lenders for the friendly surrender of the property, which prevents costly 
foreclosure litigation, but few, if any, lenders ever use this option. DIL will not necessarily avoid tax 
consequences unless lenders agree that the value of the property is worth less than the value of the 
mortgage loan balance. In the author’s real estate practice, she only negotiated one successful DIL 
transaction where the homeowners voluntarily relinquished the property and transferred title back to 
the lender by deed without the lender negatively reporting the transaction on the homeowners’ credit 
report. See generally 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1401 (2016) (Illinois is in the minority of states with 
statutes dealing with DILs); see also Thompson v. Smith, 793 P.2d 449, 449, 451 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1990) (finding that homeowners do not owe a deficiency judgment for DILs). Lenders generally do 
not allow DILs if there is also a second mortgage or other liens, such as federal tax lien, against the 
property.  
 111.  In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, taxpayers must qualify for the Income Means Test to be eligible 
to file. Chapter 7 is for individuals who have no means to repay their debts under Chapter 13. Before 
the law changed, there were fewer restrictions on eligibility for those who wished to wipe out credit 
card debt, medical bills, and most personal loans through Chapter 7 bankruptcy, regardless of their 
ability to repay their debts. For solvent taxpayers, they would need to liquidate all assets to pay any 
debts or tax liens to qualify, which most people choose not to do in lieu of a tax lien. Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 
11 U.S.C. § 101). With lenders as unsecured creditors, borrowers who fall into further financial 
hardship may qualify for relief under bankruptcy laws that might allow them to discharge the debt.  
 112.  The government, through the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative (HAFA) Program, 
attempted to give additional options for lenders to avoid costly foreclosures and incentivized them to 
enter into MSSTs or DILs with homeowners to avoid foreclosures. HAFA, supra note 39 (see link to 
MHA Compensation Matrix, last updated Nov. 3, 2014, using taxpayer dollars to pay lenders for 
successfully negotiating mortgage related transactions).  
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D. Bankruptcy and Foreclosure Alternatives to MSSTs 
There are few alternatives to MSSTs for homeowners who wish to 
avoid a potential tax liability upon the sale of their homes. Moreover, 
these alternatives might not readily be available for many middle-class 
citizens because of the qualifications required for homeowners to take 
advantage of them. A primary alternative to MSSTs is bankruptcy coupled 
with foreclosure. 
Bankruptcy113 and foreclosure correlate. They are discussed together 
because bankruptcy only stalls the foreclosure action in state court for a 
period of time so the homeowners can negotiate the sale of the property 
through MSSTs.114 The federal bankruptcy laws do not permanently 
prevent lenders from instituting a foreclosure action when a taxpayer files 
for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy filing only invokes the automatic stay 
provision under the Bankruptcy Code Section 365 temporarily because 
secured creditors and lenders can lift the automatic stay with the 
bankruptcy court’s permission and proceed with either a judicial or non-
judicial foreclosure action.115 
Once lenders are no longer subject to the bankruptcy automatic stay, 
lenders can pursue foreclosure in state court or negotiate possession of the 
property with borrowers in lieu of a foreclosure action. In the case where 
the homeowner wants to keep the property, lenders may negotiate a 
repayment plan with borrowers, including reduction of principal balance, 
or an extended term of the mortgage. However, any loan modification that 
lenders allow, whether done while the taxpayer is subject to the 
bankruptcy court or not, may create a taxable event for any reduction in 
principal for cancellation of indebtedness, much like for MSSTs. The 
bankruptcy court cannot require any modification of the loan between 
debtors/borrowers and lenders for MSSTs or modifications. 
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the bankruptcy court 
does not have jurisdiction to force lenders into a loan modification,116 or 
arguably MSSTs to sell the property. However, the deficiency judgment 
lenders obtain against borrowers resulting from a foreclosure action 
 
 113.  See supra note 111. 
 114.  Lenders have a right to foreclosure under the terms of the mortgage and through state law. 
See generally National Mortgage Law Summary, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF MORTGAGE ATTORNEYS 
(2013-14), https://www.acmaatty.org/resource/mls.cfm (listing foreclosure statutes for all 50 states). 
 115.  See 11 U.S.C.A. § 365 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15).  
 116.  Bankruptcy courts, to date, cannot renegotiate or force negotiation of mortgage terms for 
borrowers. In a 1993 decision, Nobelman v. American Savings, the Supreme Court held that it was a 
reasonable statutory interpretation of the legislative history of the law that debtors could not modify 
even the unsecured portions of mortgages on a principal residence. 508 U.S. 324, 324 (1993). 
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would be a dischargeable unsecured debt under bankruptcy laws, 
especially in jurisdictions that do not have anti-deficiency judgment 
statutes.117 For tax purposes, there would be no taxable event by 
combining bankruptcy and foreclosure because, once the foreclosure 
action is final, the lenders’ unsecured judgments are not classified as 
forgiven indebtedness and the cancellation of the debt through the 
Bankruptcy Code is allowed for unsecured debts. Thus, the 
taxpayer/debtor walks away with a fresh financial start, and, most 
importantly, is not subject to a tax liability, unlike in MSSTs. 
While bankruptcy may relieve the tax liability resulting from MSSTs 
for some taxpayers, bankruptcy is not always a viable option. Under 11 
U.S.C. § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, federal tax liens are dischargeable 
debts in bankruptcy within three years of the filing date of the tax 
return.118 In essence, the IRS would have at least three years to pursue a 
collection action for the tax liability, and if it does not take collection 
action, the taxpayer can discharge the tax liability by filing bankruptcy. 
However, if the IRS takes collection action, it stops the tolling of the three-
year period. For many taxpayers, filing for bankruptcy to avoid a tax 
liability would not be prudent if the only reason for filing bankruptcy is to 
avoid the tax liability.119 Additionally, many taxpayers trying to get back 
on their feet would not likely qualify for bankruptcy because of the strict 
income requirements120 that make filing almost impossible. Middle-class 
taxpayers, for example, would suffer more harm to their financial health 
and credit worthiness by filing bankruptcy to avoid tax consequences of 
MSSTs than by Congress amending MFDRA to address the tax burden 
created by MSSTs, at least during this ongoing time of crisis for 
homeowners suffering from the underwater real estate property market.121 
E. The Relevance of MSSTs to National Economic Recovery 
The housing market has not sufficiently stabilized, with home values 
in many states still significantly below pre-2007 market values. The lack 
 
 117.  Supra note 16. 
 118.  11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15) (setting forth 
exceptions to discharge). The IRS has no limitation period on collection if a tax return is never filed 
and has seven years if the taxpayer commits fraud or understates income by 25%. Id.  
 119.  Letter of Understanding, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, IRS, NO. 2013-0036 (Sept. 19, 2013), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/13-0036.pdf. 
 120.  See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). 
 121.  Arguably, the reckless conduct of financial institutions in the residential mortgage market, 
which abused their duty of care to borrowers in the market, caused the harm to the overall economic 
stability of the United States as well as taxpaying homeowners. See Porter, Pawns for the Higher 
Greed, supra note 26 (citing FCIC REPORT, supra note 3). 
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of economic wealth caused by the loss of home values has impeded the 
growth of the national economy because millions of Americans are unable 
to sell their homes at prices at which they can recover their equity wealth 
for spending, investing, and saving. 
In April 2014, housing data suggested that the spring selling season 
was off to a slow start. A year-to-year decline in March 2014 homes sales 
persisted in several markets, including Las Vegas, Phoenix, San Diego,122 
the Inland Empire of California, and many other urban communities.123 
The market conditions forced homeowners wishing to sell their 
underwater homes to further reduce sale prices because of the saturation 
of properties in the housing market. In some markets, the volume of 
properties with reduced housing prices was shockingly dramatic, such as 
in Phoenix, where 45% of the February 2014 listings cut sale prices, 
compared to 32% in 2013.124 The housing market remained slow going 
into the last quarter of 2014.125 
The loss of home values and lack of economic wealth for 
homeowners in many communities across the country impeded the growth 
of the national economy in several ways. First, if borrowers had been able 
to sell their homes for a price which allowed them to pay-off their 
mortgage and potentially receive some of their paid-in or accrued equity, 
they would have walked away with monies to save for future spending or 
to invest in the other markets now that the national economy has survived 
the Great Recession.126 Second, depressed property values caused risk-
adverse lenders, who escaped the worst of the financial collapse, to be 
resistant to future lending in the real estate market, as well as in non-real 
 
 122.  According to DataQuick, a San Diego research company, quoted in the Wall Street Journal. 
See Conor Dougherty & Nick Timiraos, Housing Market Slow to Hits Its Spring Stride, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303887804579503662947889776. 
 123.  These areas are unfortunately predominately minority communities, hardest hit by property 
devaluations. The eleven states with the highest number of hardest-hit ZIP codes are (in order): 
Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, New Jersey, Maryland, Missouri, California, Nevada, and 
North Carolina. See DEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 6. 
 124.  See DEIER ET AL., supra note 2; Dougherty & Timiraos, supra note 122.  
 125.  While there are statistics on foreclosure rates of properties across the country, 
unfortunately, there are no such statistics on MSSTs because MSSTs are not a matter of public record 
given the private nature of the transaction between lenders and borrowers. 
 126.  As a result of the financial crisis in the United States, eight million jobs were lost, millions 
of families lost their homes, trillions of dollars of wealth disappeared, and trillions of dollars of 
economic production failed to occur. See John Irons & Isaac Shapiro, Regulation, Employment, and 
the Economy: Fears of Job Loss are Overblown, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 12, 2011), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/regulation_employment_and_the_economy_fears_of_job_loss_are_
overblown/. As is typically the case in the wake of a financial collapse, the recovery has been slow, 
and the unemployment situation remains painful. Id. 
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estate related lending, such as small business lending.127 Third, new 
homebuyers have become hesitant to enter, or re-enter, the real estate 
market due to the ongoing volatility of home values. Finally, the potential 
future tax liability the government may place on taxpayers who engaged, 
or may engage, in MSSTs has created too great a risk of future economic 
uncertainty for the taxpayers who are now forced to conservatively spend, 
or who do not have money to spend. Thus, the underwater market has 
resulted in significant financial instability and wealth loss for citizens, and 
may be contributing to stagnancy of the national economy. 
IV. CURRENT TAX LAW REGARDING FORGIVENESS OF INDEBTEDNESS 
FOR MSSTS 
Prior to and after Congress passed MFDRA,128 the tax laws treat any 
forgiveness of indebtedness as taxable income to taxpayers.129 For tax 
years 2007 through 2015, the IRS treats MSST cancellation of 
indebtedness as an exclusion from taxable income,130 but only for 
“qualified principal residence indebtedness.”131 The goal of adding the 
MFDRA amendment to existing tax law was to provide tax relief on 
canceled debt for “homeowners involved in the mortgage foreclosure 
crisis currently affecting much of the United States.”132 The effect of the 
financial crisis will last for an unpredictable time; thus, MFDRA should 
have permanency in the tax laws with some modifications to the existing 
law, using other existing tax law to support this modification, such as 
Section I.R.C. § 121. 
The MFDRA exclusion allows taxpayers to exclude up to $2,000,000 
($1,000,000 if married filing separately) of canceled “qualified principal 
 
 127.  For examples of small business lending that was affected or other lending lines that dried 
up because of residential real estate mortgage lending problems, see Rebel A. Cole, How Did the 
Financial Crisis Affect Small Business Lending in the United States?, SBA: OFFICE OF ADVOCACY 
(Nov. 2012), http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/rs399tot.pdf.  
 128.  See Topic 431: Canceled Debt: Is it Taxable or Not?, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc431.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). 
 129.  I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15) treats discharged 
indebtedness as gross taxable income.  
 130.  See MFDRA, supra note 85. 
 131.  “Qualified” refers to the debt associated with the principal residence and includes the 
purchase money mortgage and in some circumstance debt acquired from refinancing in which monies 
were used to improve the property. See Publication 4681 (2015), Canceled Debts, Foreclosures, 
Repossessions, and Abandonments (for Individuals), IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/publications/p4681/index.html#en_US_2015_publink100024646.  
 132.  Cancelled Debt—Is It Taxable or Not? IRS TAX MAP 2014 (Dec. 8, 2014), 
http://taxmap.ntis.gov/taxmap/archive2014/taxmap/taxtp/Tt400_14-025.htm (emphasis added). 
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residence indebtedness.”133 MFDRA created the amendment to section 
I.R.C. § 108(a)(1) by providing exclusion of cancellation of indebtedness 
from gross income under limited circumstances.134 Section 108 provides 
as follows: 
Gross income does not include any amount which (but for this subsec-
tion) would be includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in 
whole or in part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if— 
. . . 
(B) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent,135 
. . . 
(E) the indebtedness discharged is qualified principal residence indebt-
edness, which lenders have discharged before January 1, 2017.136 [This 
section (E) is the amendment to the tax law created by MFDRA]. 
The goal of MFDRA was laudable; however, the scope and resulting 
impact of the law was ineffective in at least two significant respects, given 
the financial conditions of homeowners and the deluge of underwater 
properties that resulted from the 2007 market collapse. First, the 
application of the solvency rules to middle-class taxpayers created an 
ongoing inequitable impact for taxpayers who own underwater property, 
whether principal or secondary,137 and will last beyond year 2016. 
Second, related to the contradictory treatment of debt cancellation as 
taxable income under I.R.C. § 61(a)(12), the law should permanently 
apply the same or similar policy for exclusion criteria as under I.R.C. § 
121 (gains from the sale of a principal residence) because taxpayers who 
realize actual profits from a sale have no tax liability but shadow income 
from MSSTs is treated as a tax liability. If the law were to apply a forward-
thinking policy, it would alleviate the need for Congress to consider a la 
carte renewal of MFDRA until such time as the underwater real estate 
market has recovered from the financial crisis. 
 
 133.  See generally I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15).  
 134.  I.R.C. § 108. The section, in its entirety, includes: discharge of indebtedness exclusion 
from gross income for bankruptcy, insolvency, qualified farm indebtedness, qualified real property 
indebtedness, and qualified principal residence indebtedness before January 1, 2015.  
 135.  I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B). 
 136.  MFDRA, supra note 85 (emphasis added).  
 137.  While section 108(a)(1)(E) protected many homeowners of qualified principal residences 
from tax liability for MSSTs, when Congress created and renewed MFDRA, it did not address the 
narrow-sightedness of the law by only including principal residences. 
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A. Inequitable Impact of Tax Law Solvency Rules 
For MSSTs, the IRS treats the forgiveness of qualified principal 
residence indebtedness as taxable income under I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) but 
MFDRA, codified as I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(E), allows all taxpayers who are 
solvent to exclude the forgiven indebtedness from taxable income, for tax 
years 2008 through 2016. Without the exclusion under MFDRA, the 
resulting effect on both insolvent and solvent homeowners who engage in 
MSSTs is the creation of tax liability. The existing tax law, however, 
provides for the exclusion of forgiven indebtedness for insolvent 
taxpayers under I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B), with some restrictions, whether for 
principal or secondary residences, that could even make insolvent 
taxpayers subject to tax liability. Thus, truly insolvent taxpayers would 
face no liability. However, any solvent middle-class homeowner (at any 
level of solvency) and insolvent taxpayers for whom the forgiven 
indebtedness does not exceed their level of insolvency both face 
potentially severe tax liability; severe when compared to their actual 
adjusted gross income.138 
For insolvent homeowners, § 108(a)(1)(B) applies, but the IRS rules 
define who qualifies as an insolvent taxpayer.139 As this section applies to 
MSSTs that do not qualify as principal residences, if the debt the lender 
forgives is equal to, but does not exceed, the taxpayer’s insolvency level, 
then the IRS will not treat the forgiven indebtedness as taxable income. 
However, to the extent the forgiven debt exceeds the taxpayer’s 
insolvency level, the IRS generally treats that excess of forgiven 
indebtedness as taxable income, subject the excess to tax liability.140 The 
following example provides a basic application of the tax rules, although 
tax laws are never simple to understand, and only those who are astute 
practitioners of tax law know how to apply the maximum savings for 
individual taxpayers, taking into account the taxpayer’s overall financial 
landscape: 
Taking the amounts from the example in Section III(C), an insolvent 
taxpayer may face two different outcomes. Under the first insolvency 
scenario, if the taxpayer’s insolvency level is $32,000, and $32,000 is 
the forgiven indebtedness resulting from the MSST, the IRS will allow 
the taxpayer to exclude the entire $32,000 from taxable income, leaving 
 
 138.  If a taxpayer has only $1.00 of net worth, the taxpayer is considered solvent. The 
insolvency rule under § 108(a)(3) states as follows: “In the case of a discharge to which paragraph 
(1)(B) applies, the amount excluded under paragraph (1)(B) shall not exceed the amount by which the 
taxpayer is insolvent.” I.R.C. § 108(a)(3) (emphasis added).  
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
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the insolvent taxpayer with no tax liability. However, the second insol-
vency scenario yields a different outcome, in that if the taxpayer’s in-
solvency level is only $20,000, and $32,000 is the forgiven indebtedness 
resulting from the MSST, the IRS will only allow taxpayer to exclude 
$20,000 from taxable income, but treat the remaining $12,000 of for-
given indebtedness as taxable income that would create a tax liability, 
even though the taxpayer is still insolvent after the MSST.141 
Thus, insolvent taxpayers who sell underwater properties through 
MSSTs are treated unequally based on the level of their insolvency—
applying harsher standards to those who have more indebtedness than to 
other insolvent taxpayers. This latter scenario makes it almost impossible 
for financially suffering taxpayers to recover from the impact of the 
financial crisis and Great Recession. 
B. Tax Treatment of Actual versus Shadow Income 
Taxpayers who are unaware of the intricacies of the tax code might 
find themselves in dire financial straits after engaging in MSSTs because 
the IRS’s application of rules from other sections of the tax code apply to 
MFRDA, and can result in disqualification of MFDRA’s protection from 
tax liability. In particular, the rules under I.R.C. § 121, dealing primarily 
with gains from the sale of a principal residence, apply in determining 
when a property qualifies as a principal residence under MFDRA.142 
Section 121 is a part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.143 Under § 
121, taxpayers who sell their principal residence are entitled to a 
permanent exclusion from taxable gross income for capital gains from the 
sale of up to $250,000 for individuals, and $500,000 for married couples 
filing jointly. The section, in effect, allows taxpayers to keep the wealth 
from the sale without any tax consequences. While the exclusion under § 
121 is not applicable under MFDRA, some other rules from § 121 apply 
to MSSTs subject to MFDRA. For example, taxpayers must own and 
occupy their principal residence for at least two calendar years in the last 
five years prior to the date of the MSST to qualify for MFDRA protection, 
 
 141.  Taxpayers are allowed the exclusions from gross income versus adjustable gross income 
where taxpayers are allowed deductions to offset the adjustable income or credits allowed against any 
ultimate tax liability a taxpayer may owe. As an alternative to exclusion for income under MFDRA, 
any tax liability resulting from MSSTs could be offset by a dollar-for-dollar credit to eliminate 
taxpayers’ tax liability. 
 142.  I.R.C. § 121 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). 
 143.  Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997). The law also 
created the child tax credit and Roth IRAs for retirement. Id. 
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the same as under § 121.144 While ownership in title cannot be broken 
during the five-year period, the occupancy requirement does not have to 
be continuous. Thus, if taxpayers engaged in MSSTs in December 2009, 
the prior five years run back to 2004, so taxpayers must have occupied the 
property for two calendar years with the intent that the property was their 
principal residence. However, homeowners who may have been unaware 
of the ownership and occupancy rule under § 121 that applied to MFDRA 
protection could have easily become subject to tax liability if they missed 
the two-year occupancy requirement by even one day. 
In addition to the principal residence classification rule under § 121, 
the treatment of forgiven indebtedness from MSSTs as taxable income is 
unfair because § 121 excludes actual profit from the sale of the principal 
residence from taxable income. This aspect of the § 121 exclusion could 
have easily been incorporated into MFDRA upon its passage, if the tax 
code had been considered in its entirety. And even if Congress considered 
§ 121’s exclusion treatment, then it should have addressed the inequality 
in the application of § 121 and § 108(a)(1)(E) that creates an unfair penalty 
on some taxpayers while rewarding others. In better market conditions, 
not affected by a financial crisis or Great Recession, the law is 
permanently in place for taxpayers who would have no tax liability for 
actual realized monetary gain from the sale of their principal residence 
under § 121, in which taxpayers keep the actual money without any tax 
recourse. However, in the ongoing depressed market conditions, almost 
10 million taxpayers with underwater properties going into 2015 face a 
different situation. These homeowners face tax liability if they sell 
underwater property and they do not realize any actual money, just a 
canceled debt. The tax laws penalize these homeowners. Thus, the 
government’s attempt to provide relief to taxpayers has penalized some 
taxpayers with underwater property, but has rewarded other taxpayers 
who are allowed to walk away with actual profits from the sale of their 
property without penalty—an awful disparity in the law that Congress 
must correct. Moreover, the problem with underwater properties sold 
under MSSTs and the resulting tax liability will perpetuate into the future 
without an expansion of MFDRA’s coverage. 
C. IRS Collection Actions for Tax Liability Created by MSSTs 
For taxpayers who sell their underwater property and who do not 
qualify for either MFDRA relief or the insolvency rule under § 
 
 144.  Supra note 141. 
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108(a)(1)(B), there is the possibility of facing the burden of not only a tax 
liability but also an IRS collection action. The IRS has up to seven years 
from the date a taxpayer files a tax return to initiate a collection action for 
“substantial misstatement of income,” which would include forgiven 
indebtedness.145 In our example earlier in this section, a $32,000 
cancellation of debt may be a substantial misstatement of income 
depending on the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. Not only are 
taxpayers subject to an extended collection period, but also the IRS’s 
collection action can create devastating hardship on taxpayers, as 
Congress has noted in the past.146 
It is likely that millions of taxpayers are unaware of these rules or the 
impact on their financial wellbeing until it is too late. To further burden 
taxpayers, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to prove that the property 
was a qualified principal residence for the requisite period. If the IRS 
challenges the sale as a qualified principal residence, it has up to seven 
years from the time the taxpayers filed the tax return in question to seek 
collection of the tax liability. This is problematic for taxpayers who may 
be unable to produce credible evidence of their intent to claim the 
qualified principal residence exclusion under MFDRA after they vacate 
the property or rent it. Such an audit by the IRS places further unnecessary 
burden and stress on taxpayers, especially in light of the challenging 
landscape created by the financial crisis. 
Thus, the worst is not over for millions of homeowners who still own 
underwater property they cannot sell, or if they do sell will do so with 
potential tax liability and face an IRS collection action. Congress’ action 
has still not adequately addressed the ongoing problems that persist for 
“homeowners involved in the mortgage foreclosure crisis.” 
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE HOMEOWNERSHIP TAX POLICY CRISIS 
Congress needs to act to resolve the problems of the tax burden 
imposed on homeowners who sell underwater property and the disparate 
treatment of taxpayers under the current MRFDA.147 This Part provides a 
 
 145.  The tax code definition includes “substantial misstatement of income.” See I.R.C. § 6662 
(LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). For the 2014 tax year, in which taxpayer files 
returns on April 15, 2015, the seven years runs from April 2015. In addition, while the IRS is able to 
waive penalties, it cannot waive interest that accrues for the time the tax liability accrues in April 
2015. Id.  
 146.  Unlike creditors, the IRS is not subject to the FDCPA and have almost unrestricted 
collection methods for collecting tax liabilities taxpayers owe the government. Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f). In the 
author’s humble opinion, it would be better to owe a creditor than the government through the IRS.  
 147.  This could give the perception that they were placing consumers’ interests above their own 
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number of important provisions that Congress should include in 
congressional corrections to remedy problems with MSSTs. 
Until progressive legislative tax reform is enacted, the lending 
industry will continue to use MSSTs to its advantage to avoid the liability 
of taking title to underwater properties, thus allowing unwary borrowers 
to accrue potential tax and resulting financial burdens from these 
transactions. Both the government and industry, however, can play an 
essential role in relieving the tax burdens of MSSTs for consumers if the 
government amends current tax laws and the banking and real estate 
industries support the passage of consumer-focused legislation. While the 
banking and real estate industries’ support may seem unnatural to 
advocates for consumers whose interest may be in direct conflict with 
these industries, tangible benefit for these industries and the economy is 
attainable, especially by rebuilding a financially healthy consumer-
market, which would support a stabilized national economy and future 
lending opportunities. Legislators and the banking and real estate 
industries could compromise in supporting legislative change in the 
following areas: (1) a permanent extension and expansion of MFDRA, (2) 
new government-issued disclosures to homeowners, and (3) a permanent 
moratorium on the IRS’s collection of taxes related to MSSTs. 
A. Extension and Broader Scope of MFDRA 
The government should extend MFDRA’s applicability and scope 
until underwater property values are at insignificant levels. With the 
support of President Barack Obama, Congress extended MFDRA in its 
existing form in late December 2015 to cover MSSTs for tax year 2015.148 
The failure of Congress to extend the MFDRA’s coverage beyond 2016, 
however, leaves little hope for millions of underwater homeowners who 
may not avoid tax liability since they may have to engage in MSSTs 
beyond 2016. 
Although the main body of the law may not need redrafting, the 
government should amend the law to include: 
(1) the same exclusion treatment for secondary homes; 
 
profitable interests. Porter, Pawns for the Higher Greed, supra note 25. 
 148.  See generally H.R. 3856 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014): 
Section 1. Short title 
This Act may be cited as the Homeowners Debt Relief Extension Act of 2014. 
Section 2. Extension of exclusion from gross income of discharge of qualified principal residence 
indebtedness 
(a) In general—Subparagraph (E) of section 108(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 is amended by striking January 1, 2014 and inserting January 1, 2016. 
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(2) the inclusion of any principal residence that changed status due 
to economic hardship but qualified as a principal residence anytime after 
2007; 
(3) an exclusion from taxable income similar to the I.R.C. § 121, for 
either a principal residence or a secondary residence; 149 and 
(4) extension of these provisions until the underwater property 
market is eliminated, or at a superficial volume. 
These amendments would provide real and practical solutions for 
taxpayers. Only the taxpayers that truly need the relief of MFDRA would 
use it because the scope and coverage would be broad enough to redress 
only the tax liability issue of underwater principal and secondary 
residences, not any other type of investment property. Congress would 
also have the power to repeal the law when MFDRA’s full usefulness is 
exhausted and there are no longer huge numbers of taxpayers under the 
burden of ownership of underwater property. 
The banking and real estate industries should have little reason to 
oppose such reform, but in fact may benefit by urging the support of this 
legal reform because these proposals of law do not threaten their interests 
and would eliminate their need to take any adverse action against their 
own profitable interests. Because millions of American properties are still 
underwater, this pragmatic solution would protect millions of 
homeowners from further financial distress. Public policy calls for the 
government to rescue consumers by taking action within its powers. 
B. The Disclosure Regime—Government Duty to Disclose 
Some perceive disclosure laws as the strongest consumer weapons 
against asymmetry of information, but creditors have been most willing 
to undermine this method of regulation.150 Indeed, the financial and real 
 
 149.  Under I.R.C. § 121 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15), the government, 
through the Tax Code, allows anyone who sells a principal residence to exclude from one’s taxable 
income any profits, or gain, from the sale of the property; single persons up to $250,000, married 
persons up to $500,000. This class of consumers does not have to pay taxes on this profit from the 
sale that appreciated in value, either through their own improvements or maybe just due to market 
forces. The reverse should also hold true because consumers who failed to make a profit on the sale 
of a principal residence are unfairly penalized, especially in this unique world where MSSTs evolved 
due to market conditions that the lending industry facilitated and the real estate industry perpetuated 
to both industries’ very profitable ends. 
 150.  See Tracie R. Porter, The Field Between Lions and Zebras . . . Evening the Playing Field 
Between Lenders and Borrowers: Conflicts of Interest and Legal Obligations in the Residential 
Mortgage Transaction, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 623, 631 (2012) [hereinafter Porter, Conflicts of 
Interest]. See also Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, The Whole Truth, and Nothing 
but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 209-11 (2008) 
(finding that most borrowers do not sufficiently understand how this information is processed by 
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estate industries have viewed disclosure legislation as extremely intrusive 
regulation of their industries. The Banking and Financial Services 
Industry (BFSI) and Realtors Associations have engaged in massive 
lobbying efforts against disclosure regulation whenever possible, 
including the Truth in Lending Act and some aspects of the Wall Street 
Reform Act and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Act, also known 
as the Dodd-Frank Act.151 The disclosure solution proposed here, 
however, is different from those already in effect, in that it protects 
consumers not against the perils of dealing with the industry players but 
in dealing with the government through the IRS. The complexity of tax 
laws inherently creates asymmetry of information for taxpayers, which 
subjects them to tax liability that, once created, is almost impossible to get 
relief from. 
When homeowners use MSSTs, unlike situations in which 
consumers buy a home, refinance a home, buy a car, or even lease 
property, lenders and Realtors are not required by law to inform 
consumers of any potential onerous financial, or tax, consequences of 
engaging in MSSTs. To the contrary, once lenders approve MSSTs, they 
are not required to report the transaction until months after MSSTs are 
consummated and the property sells. Under the proposed new disclosure 
approach, the government, through the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB), would be required to give all borrowers with underwater 
properties disclosures explaining the potential tax implications from 
MSSTs on a quarterly basis until the property is no longer considered an 
underwater property.152 A quarterly basis is preferred in case homeowners 
attempt to engage in MSSTs, which take several months for lenders to 
 
lenders, or how to evaluate information in the legal disclosures—if they understand the disclosed 
information at all). Disclosures are arguably an ineffective method for protecting and educating 
consumers about mortgage industry practices. Id. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 65 (referring to 
Truth in Lending Act disclosures and noting that “Judge Posner pointed [out] . . . ‘[n]ot all persons 
are capable of being careful readers”‘). 
 151.  Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f). The BFSI and Realtors Associations 
have engaged in massive lobbying efforts against disclosure whenever possible, such as with the 
CARD Act. Id. 
 152.  See HAFA, supra note 39 (providing text of Short Sale Agreement the government posted 
to the website for borrowers). The text reads:  
The difference between the remaining amounts of principal you owe and the amount that 
we receive from the sale must be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on Form 
1099C, as debt forgiveness. In some cases, debt forgiveness could be taxed as income. The 
amount, if any, we pay you or your tenant for moving expenses may also be reported as 
income. We suggest that you contact the IRS or your tax preparer to determine if you may 
have any tax liability.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
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come to an agreement. In the alternative, the CFPB would submit a notice 
through lenders in monthly mortgage statements. The cost to the CFPB 
would be administrative, which to an agency charged with oversight and 
reporting on financial institutions in order to protect consumers is a 
nominal cost compared to the financial devastation that could result from 
tax liability for homeowners who engage in MSSTs. Thus, disclosure 
through the government’s CFPB is likely the most reliable method of 
getting the homeowners attention about the tax implications for selling 
underwater property.153 The government also benefits from the public 
good it does for its citizens by protecting them at the outset of the 
transaction and expending fewer resources than when instituting tax 
collection actions against taxpayers. 
In MSSTs, the consumers’ biggest adversary is the IRS, not the 
lenders or Realtors; therefore, neither industry has any real reasons to 
oppose such reforms in the disclosure laws. More importantly, the 
potential tax liability to taxpayers is too great to ignore the necessity of 
information needed to make an informed decision about MSSTs. 
C. Permanent Moratorium on IRS’s Collection of Tax Liability Resulting 
from MSSTs 
Congress should also place a permanent moratorium on the 
collection of tax liability resulting from MSSTs until the real estate market 
in many jurisdictions stabilizes and underwater properties in the market 
are insignificant in nature. Similar to the April 2014 letter of 
understanding the IRS issued to the State of California in which the IRS 
stated that it would not enforce collection against taxpayers in California, 
the government and IRS can maintain a similar stance with all taxpayers 
who sell their homes through MSSTs and face possible tax liability. 
The collection actions of the IRS are the most aggressive of any 
vendor in any industry so such a permanent moratorium would stop 
aggressive collection actions that often result in unbearable financial and 
psychological effects from the IRS’s sometimes futile attempts to collect 
tax revenues. In pursuing collection, the government, through the IRS, 
 
 153.  See Porter, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 150. They must then provide consumers with 
a cooling period to seek representation on the issue of at least five business days so that consumers 
can get un-conflicted legal or financial advice from a professional best suited to represent their 
interests. The delay in transaction is no more onerous on the lenders and Realtors than any other 
disclosure required for the transactions that the government deemed important to protect consumer 
rights such as the three-day grace period for refinancing homes. Another option is to provide lenders 
with a safe harbor protection for early reporting of the 1099-C event, at such time as lenders present 
the MSSTs offer to borrowers so borrowers still have time to cancel the deal and pursue other options. 
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places a burden on consumers that need not exist and for a transaction that 
lenders walk away from with little or no losses while consumers continue 
to suffer. Thus, the government should initiate a permanent moratorium 
on collection of any potential revenues generated from MSSTs. Moreover, 
the potential lost tax revenue is insignificant, especially in comparison to 
§ 121 discussion above where the government is willing to forego tax 
revenues on real profits from a sale of property, foregoing substantial 
revenues that can actually be collected, versus uncollectable revenues 
from shadow income from MSSTs. 
As of April 2014, California is the only state with a special agreement 
with the IRS that allows its residences to avoid tax liability from MSSTs 
regardless of solvency, but only related to principal residences. On April 
29, 2014, the IRS issued a letter of understanding (LOU) to the Honorable 
Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA).154 The LOU included the IRS’s response 
to the Senator’s request and clarified the IRS’s letter, dated September 19, 
2013, in which Senator Boxer addressed the question of whether 
cancellation of indebtedness from a lender-approved [mortgage] short sale 
would be considered taxable income for California homeowners.155 
California passed an anti-deficiency judgment statute, under California 
Civil Procedure Act § 580e, that prevents lenders who foreclose on 
principal residences from collecting any deficiency judgments resulting 
from foreclosures. Section 580e only applies to qualified principal 
residences that homeowners acquired with purchase money mortgage 
loans.156 Section 580e treats the deficiency for cancelled mortgage 
amounts as a non-recourse debt obligation. Thus, for federal tax purposes, 
the IRS agreed not to treat the cancellation of indebtedness as taxable 
income based on Section 580e. 
This limited exception for California homeowners with underwater 
principal residences157 should not apply to only California taxpayers when 
the impact of the financial crisis affected all U.S. taxpayers. Additionally, 
this limited circumstance in California created by Section 580e does not 
 
 154.  Letter of Understanding, DEPT. OF THE TREAS., IRS, No. 2014-0018 (Apr. 29, 2014), 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/14-0018.pdf. 
 155.  The letter of understanding and CA law do not apply to non-judicial foreclosures or 
mortgage loan modifications. See infra, note 161. 
 156.  Section 580e requires that the mortgage loan is the only secured indebtedness against the 
property, so there are no second lien holders. The law applies to dwellings of not more than four units. 
The lender must consent in writing to the MSST, indicating that the loan will be tendered, and 
ultimately is tendered, to the lender at less than the outstanding balance owed. Title must transfer to 
a third-party buyer and be recorded. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580e (LEXIS, through Chapter 11 of 
the 2016 Regular Session and Chapter 3 of the 2015-16 2nd Extraordinary Session). 
 157.  Supra note 93. 
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reflect the various situations that impact taxpayers across the country with 
underwater properties that may no longer qualify as principal residences. 
The IRS even stated in its original September 19, 2013, letter to Senator 
Boxer that, although other states have enacted anti-deficiency judgment 
statutes, the letter only limited the consequences under California Civil 
Procedure Act, Section 580e.158 The LOU with California reveals that the 
IRS is not myopic but will act when pressed by legislators, even if 
informally through an LOU. Formal action, through legislation passed by 
Congress, that creates equal treatment for all taxpayers is paramount. 
D. Government Paternalist Action Required 
Governmental paternalist action is warranted to assist in resolving 
the problem of tax liability that accompanies MSST transactions. 
Congress is in a better position to protect taxpayers and to inform them 
about the tax consequences of MSSTs than are Realtors or lenders through 
provisions contained in sales contracts or MSST agreements. Realtors and 
lenders also inherently have a conflict of interest with homeowners given 
their motivation to sell the property for commission in regard to Realtors 
and to minimize liability and increase profitability for lenders.159 At a 
minimum, the government, through agencies like the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), should assure that borrowers with underwater 
properties who are considering MSSTs receive all pertinent information 
about the tax rules and consequences before engaging in MSSTs. The 
CFPB, to which some mortgage lenders report, should provide the 
information to all homeowners with underwater properties so that 
taxpayers are allowed adequate time to consider or to seek counseling 
about how to avoid the tax liability associated with MSSTs. However, 
informing taxpayers about tax liability is just one thing Congress can 
mandate to ensure consumer protection. 
Legislative reform by extending MFDRA and expanding the tax 
rules that apply under MFDRA is another means Congress can use to 
protect homeowners using MSSTs to relieve their financial burdens. The 
disparity in tax treatment between solvent and insolvent taxpayers160 
 
 158.  Letter of Understanding, No. 2013-0036, supra note 119. 
 159.  Porter, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 150. Furthermore, they are not qualified tax 
advisors, they may be unaware of the implications of the rules on the particular taxpayer or 
inadequately knowledgeable about the rules themselves, or they might not want to manage the conflict 
of interest that exists between their own interest to close the deal versus what is in the best interest of 
the taxpayer/borrower/homeowner. Id.  
 160.  The mortgage lending industry further perpetuated the gambling by using insolvent 
taxpayers (through the riskiest lending standards, such as no documentation loans) as pawns for the 
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related to MSSTs is so significant that Congress must take action to 
protect homeowners. Congress’s expansion of the law to address, in a 
practical way, the hardship taxpayers could face will put taxpayers in a 
better financial position in the long-run and may alleviate the need for 
costly and stressful foreclosure actions, for both lenders and homeowners. 
Until then, the Tax Code should continue to provide leniency for all 
taxpayers who may realize tax liability from cancellation of indebtedness 
due to MSSTs into the future until only a de minimis portion, not ten 
million, of the properties in the national real estate market remain 
underwater; an ongoing consequence of the “mortgage foreclosure crisis 
still affecting most of the United States.”161 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress must provide a solution to the quagmire of financial 
indebtedness that is promoted by current tax policy associated with 
MSSTs. The massive introduction of MSSTs following the 2007 financial 
crisis and subsequent mortgage foreclosure crisis created a financial 
quagmire for many homeowners that Congress has not effectively 
resolved. This Article has outlined how Congress can and should act to 
relieve middle-class taxpayers of the burden of substantial federal tax 
liability that currently results when lenders forgive indebtedness of 
homeowners through the use of MSSTs. For the still-evolving, residential 
real estate landscape that includes almost ten million homeowners who 
own underwater properties, Congress must enact a broader, more 
comprehensive law that adequately addresses the continuing crisis in the 
residential real estate market. The alternative is that middle-class 
taxpayers with underwater properties, including both principal and 
secondary residences, will continue to suffer severe financial impacts 
under the tax code when they sell underwater property using lender-
controlled and approved MSSTs.162 
Further, in order for the government to prevent perpetuation of the 
 
most risky mortgage products ever introduced into the residential mortgage market. See Porter, Pawns 
for the Higher Greed, supra note 25; see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 61. 
 161.  I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15) treats discharged 
indebtedness as gross taxable income. See DEIER ET AL., supra note 2 (identifying the many zip codes 
in minority communities impacted by property devaluations). If citizens are experiencing hardship 
and unable to survive financially, the health of the economy suffers because citizens have no money 
for stimulating spending in the markets, more citizens may need greater government assistance for 
survival, and the progression to economic recovery and stability is stifled at a slow pace for middle-
class Americans. See generally id. 
 162.  The Tax Code already provides relief for insolvent taxpayers under I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B) 
(LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). 
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misconception to homeowners that the lending163 and real estate 
industries’ facilitation of residential MSSTs are financially beneficial to 
homeowners,164 Congress must provide relief through federal legislative 
tax reform. Among other provisions, the reform should extend the 
MFRDA until the number of underwater properties is insignificant, and it 
should amend MFDRA to include a broader scope of coverage for 
principal and secondary residences. The tax code should also be amended 
to consistently apply rules for true profit gains under § 121 versus shadow 
profits from cancellation of indebtedness from MSSTs under § 108. The 
proposal would also require the government to disseminate disclosures 
through the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, effectively informing 
borrowers with underwater properties of the tax consequences of 
engaging in MSSTs and that, currently, the federal government through 
the IRS may initiate onerous collection actions against taxpayers. 
Effective public policy in relation to tax reform should not only 
change specific provisions of the law, but it should also do so to 
implement social policy that reflects the social values of American 
citizens. The 2007 financial crisis was a catastrophic earthquake the after-
shocks of which are still being felt and will continue for many years to 
come. The government can and should come to its citizens’ aid in this 
ongoing crisis, and it should resurrect long-standing American policies 
that promote and protect homeownership. 
 
 
 163.  “BFSI” is a term coined by the author. See Porter, Pawns for the Higher Greed, supra note 
25. 
 164.  The majority of solvent middle-class taxpayers in need of tax relief are already in higher 
income tax brackets than lenders who receive favorable corporate tax rates. Although the U.S. 
Corporate Tax Rate is between 15% and 35%, most large corporations find a way to zero out their tax 
liability. Matt Krantz, Large Companies Find a Way to Zero Tax Rate, USA TODAY (Feb. 19, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/10/23/big-companies-pay-no-taxes/2480281/. 
A surprising number of companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500, 57, have found ways to pay effective 
tax rates of zero, according to a USA Today analysis of data from S&P Capital IQ. The news comes 
months after the Government Accountability Office released a report showing that companies in 2010 
reported an average effective tax rate of 12.6%, well below the 35% federal corporate tax rate. Id. 
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